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Struggle in the Sunshine City:
The Movement for Racial Equality in St. Petersburg Florida, 1955-1968
Peyton L. Jones
ABSTRACT

Recent decades have seen a shift in the focus of civil rights historiography.
Building upon the exhaustive studies of national figures and events, and in search of new
perspectives, many historians have concentrated on local movements often ignored or
forgotten. Other than the work of a few local scholars, the civil rights movement as it
occurred in St. Petersburg, Florida, has received little attention. Furthermore, the limited
scholarship lacks the cohesion necessary to compare and contrast the movement with
similar events throughout the state and across the nation. The story of St. Petersburg‟s
active and significant struggle for social equality, placed within its proper context, adds
another piece to a larger picture and continues to reveal the complex nature of the
American Civil Rights Movement.

ii

Chapter One: Introduction
Recent decades have seen a shift in the focus of civil rights historiography.
Building upon the exhaustive studies of national figures and events, and in search of new
perspectives, many historians have concentrated on local movements often ignored or
forgotten. Other than the work of a few local scholars, the civil rights movement as it
occurred in St. Petersburg, Florida, has received little attention. Furthermore, the limited
scholarship lacks the cohesion necessary to compare and contrast the movement with
similar events throughout the state and across the nation. The story of St. Petersburg‟s
active and significant struggle for social equality, placed within its proper context, adds
another piece to a larger picture and continues to reveal the complex nature of the
American Civil Rights Movement.
In the years following the Second World War, St. Petersburg was a burgeoning
tourist Mecca and retirement haven. Between 1950 and 1960 the city‟s population
increased eighty-seven percent, reaching 181,348 in 1960. Those flocking to St.
Petersburg arrived in a place that seemed to live up to the picture painted in promotional
leaflets and booster pamphlets: a warm, inviting community, blessed with a subtropical
climate, pristine beaches, cheap land, and endless sunshine. A veritable “Sunshine City.” 1
Absent from booster literature, however, were references to a substantial black
population. From its earliest years, St. Petersburg‟s economy depended heavily on
tourism and a black labor force to service that industry. The city‟s black underclass lived
at the lowest civic stratum, confined by rigid Jim Crow laws. While the white seasonal
residents and snowbirds enjoyed socializing on the city‟s famous green benches, listening
to concerts in downtown Williams Park, or enjoying friendly competition at the
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Shuffleboard Club, an army of African Americans swarmed into their hotel rooms to
make beds, or into their homes to cook meals, clean the dishes, and tend to the
landscaping. To most visitors, however, these workers remained invisible and their
contribution to the region‟s economic development seemed irrelevant. 2
City leaders justified racial oppression by framing the need to perpetuate
segregation in economic terms. Black workers allowed hotels, restaurants, attractions,
and the municipal infrastructure to handle the seasonal influx of tourists, yet business and
governmental leaders assumed that snowbirds and their wallets would flock elsewhere if
black residents became too visible. For those Detroiters concerned about blacks entering
their neighborhoods back home, city leaders in St. Petersburg wanted them to feel
reassured that no similar integration would darken their experience in the Sunshine City.
With occasional concessions to the black community, often with a heavy dose of
paternalism, the city‟s white power structure was able to deny the black community any
real reform.
Indeed, St. Petersburg remained one of the most residentially segregated cities in
the nation at the dawn of the civil rights era. In the city‟s earliest black neighborhoods,
residents formed tight-knit, insular enclaves that drew strength from the bonds forged
under social oppression. By the 1950s, beyond the auspices of white St. Petersburg,
existed a stratified and culturally diverse black community. Along the rippling, bricklined 5th Ave S., in an area known as Sugar Hill, lived members of St. Petersburg‟s black
elite. With roots as old as the city itself, this small yet substantial black middle-class,
1
2

St. Petersburg Times, May 8, 1960.
Arsenault, St. Petersburg and the Florida Dream, 124-125.
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composed of physicians, clergymen, entrepreneurs, and educators, formed the backbone
of the civil rights struggle. 3
The epicenter of black society arose on 22nd Ave S., where the likes of Louis
Armstrong and Duke Ellington performed at the Manhattan Casino, where black doctors
tended to patients at the segregated Mercy Hospital, and where residents went for food
and sundries, to catch a movie, go dancing, or get their hair cut. Locals dubbed 22 nd Ave
the “Deuces” and until the early sixties, in the earliest stages of integration, one could
trace the heartbeat of black society back to this area. Yet the Manhattan Casino was not
the Cotton Club in Harlem and for every black middle-class dwelling one did not have to
look far to find abject poverty. In areas such as Methodist Town- where almost thirteen
percent of the city‟s black population lived-dilapidated shanties stood unpainted and
teeming with termites. Many homes had no indoor plumbing nor properly working
electricity. Garbage piled high in front of sagging porches with rotten floorboards, lining
dirt streets that turned to dust clouds on arid summer days and muddy streams during the
evening thunderstorms. A handful of wealthy, politically connected white citizens owned
all of Methodist Town‟s slum housing and successfully managed to strike down urban
renewal legislation and thwart efforts to enforce minimum housing code requirements.
The slumlords who regularly increased the rent rarely reinvested money back into the
blighted neighborhood. With an average income of less than $3,000 a year, residents--in a
relationship that resembled the landed gentry and the disfranchised sharecropper of
earlier generations-- had no other choice but to stay put.4
3

Rosalie Peck and Jon Wilson, St. Petersburg’s Historic African American Neighborhoods (Charleston,
South Carolina: The History Press, 2008), 33-34.
4
Author‟s interview with Omali Yeshitela, June 23, 2009; St. Petersburg Times, May 5, 1960, March 25,
1962. Peck and Wilson, African American Neighborhoods, 31-33.
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Cracks in the paternalistic relationship between whites and blacks, and in the once
entrenched, seemingly immutable social structure that defied life in St. Petersburg, began
to appear in the 1950s. After the 1954 Supreme Court decision, Brown v. Board of
Education, a number of St. Petersburg‟s black elite challenged the legality of segregated
public facilities. In November 1955, shortly after several black residents were denied
entrance to Spa Beach and Pool, a public recreational facility, six black citizens led by
Dr. Fred Alsup filed suit against the city citing a violation of their constitutional rights.
The legal battle lasted until April 1957, when the Supreme Court refused to hear the
city‟s final appeal, but controversy over Spa Beach and pool continued. For almost two
years, city administrators attempted to circumvent the Court‟s ruling by closing the pool
any time blacks tried to use the facility. After a long standoff, Spa Beach and Pool
eventually opened on an integrated basis in 1959.
But the struggle had only begun. During the 1960s, homegrown civic
organizations like the Civic Coordinating Committee (CCC), the Council on Human
Relations (COHR), along with local incarnations of nationally affiliated organizations
like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the
Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee (SNCC), continued the attack on racial segregation. By the mid-1960s, after
the desegregation of lunch counters and movie theaters, the objectives of the struggle
were no longer clear. In 1964, lawyer Jim Sanderlin, with the support of the NAACP
Legal Defense Fund, took on the cause of desegregating the school system. Organizations
like the CCC and COHR fought discrimination in the work place and tried to secure
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better job opportunities for black citizens. While many saw these two areas as
inextricably linked, others abandoned the notion of integration altogether.
Disillusionment spread throughout the black community in the middle and late
1960s. Nonviolent forms of protest seemed inadequate at addressing the larger
socioeconomic goals of the civil rights movement. Race riots erupted across the country.
No longer could Americans pigeonhole white racism and bigotry or black
impoverishment as a distinctly Southern phenomenon. America was sick.
The dissatisfaction was evident in St. Petersburg. A militant counter movement
emerged that threatened to upend the advances of the local struggle and tear apart the
fabric of the entire city. Much of the tension culminated in 1968, when St. Petersburg‟s
sanitation workers-most of whom were black-went on strike. After a four-month standoff
over better pay, St. Petersburg‟s black community dissolved into violent race riots.
Similar to the transformative events that rocked other communities across America, the
demands for reform by the sanitation workers in 1968 marked an important new era in
the local struggle to trash the traditions of Jim Crow.
This study traces a thirteen year struggle for racial justice between 1955 and
1968--one that began many years earlier and continues to this day. But during these
years, St. Petersburg, like the nation itself, came to terms with a reality it had for too long
denied. How could this happen in a sleepy resort town? What sort of light can St.
Petersburg‟s story shed on the larger civil rights struggle in America? As historians
confront the larger geographic and regional identity of the Sunshine State, a peek into its
race relations history is a necessary piece in a much larger puzzle.

5

Chapter Two: The Gathering Storm
In August 1955, black civil rights activists in St. Petersburg, Florida, waded into
controversial currents. Ten members of the Civic Coordinating Committee (CCC), a
prominent black civic organization, approached the racially segregated Spa Beach and
Pool municipal swimming facility and attempted to gain entrance. After refusing to sell
them tickets the cashier called the police, who told the activists to “use their own beach,”
down the road at South Mole. The situation ended without incident shortly thereafter.
Two months later, after petitioning the city for “public use” of Spa and getting no
response, the CCC filed a federal lawsuit, citing a violation of equal protection
guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus began a nearly four year struggle to
integrate Spa--one that ultimately sparked a movement to end racial inequality
throughout the city. 1
The efforts to desegregate Spa were “no spur of the moment thing,” explained
CCC president J.P. Moses. Indeed, controversy surrounding beach access for black
residents stretched back nearly forty years. In 1916, when Mayor Al Lang granted blacks
a strip of beach on the south side of the city that eventually became known as South
Mole, white residents protested. The issue arose again during the Great Depression. As
part of efforts to revive a moribund tourism industry, the city strengthened and officially
codified its Jim Crow laws. Moreover, the parlous economic conditions intensified the
racial divide. Whites lodged complaints about blacks traveling through white parts of
town to get to South Mole. To ease the tensions, the city formed the Interracial Relations
Committee (IRC). The IRC, according to historian Raymond Arsenault, focused
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primarily on the black beach issue. Efforts continued in the 1940s to no avail, and by
1955, South Mole, a dingy strip of beach with no life guards and no bathing facilities,
stood as the only place along St. Petersburg‟s forty-five miles of coastline for blacks to
swim legally. 2
Everything changed in 1954, when the U.S. Supreme Court outlawed public
school desegregation in Brown v. Board of Education. While awaiting the Court‟s plan
for implementing Brown, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP), with branches throughout the state, encouraged blacks to use their taxsupported municipal facilities. “Why use beaches of your own when you have a beach
that your taxes are paying for?” proclaimed NAACP attorney Ray Chisolm. While state
officials worked to forestall public school integration, blacks across Florida, from Delray
Beach and Daytona, to Miami and Sarasota, began testing the legality of segregated
beaches. 3
In the wake of Brown, black leaders in St. Petersburg began “pushing” for action.
“We knew we needed to create an incident,” said black physician and CCC member, Fred
Alsup. “I finally got my barber,” he remembered, “and said „let‟s get this thing on the
road.‟” Upon arriving at Spa Beach and Pool, they “had no definite proof that Negroes
would be denied the use” of the facilities, but the CCC activists anticipated rejection,
1

Darryl Paulson, “Stay Out, The Water‟s Fine: Desegregating Municipal Swimming Facilities in St.
Petersburg, Florida,”Tampa Bay History 4, no. 2 (1982): 8; St. Petersburg Times, August 22, September 9,
1955, September 21, 1955, and December 1, 1955.
2
St. Petersburg Times, August 22, 1955, October 14, 1916; Raymond Arsenault, St. Petersburg and the
Florida Dream, 1888-1950. (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1996), 265-267; and Paulson, “Stay
Out,” 7.
3
Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and Black America’s
Struggle For Equality, 2nd ed. (New York: Vinatge Books, 2004), 711; Paulson, “Stay Out,” 8; New York
Times, March 13, 1956.
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hoping to lay the groundwork for “potential legal action.” 4
The unexpected breech in racial etiquette elicited a streak of white hostility. In the
days following the “swim-in,” a group of angry whites met at city hall and formed the St.
Petersburg White Citizens‟ Council. The organization sent letters to restaurants and
businesses downtown, urging merchants not to “help integrate the races.” But the fiercest
opposition to integrating Spa came from City Manager Ross Windom, who condemned
the “swim-in” and criticized the black community for its unhappiness with South Mole.
However, the rash assemblage of reactionary forces and the dismay emanating from city
hall mattered little once the CCC‟s case against the city, Alsup v. St. Petersburg, went to
trial. 5
Lawyers for the city faced an arduous task. A month before the CCC filed suit, on
November 7, the Supreme Court had banned segregation at public facilities in Maryland.
The ruling affirmed a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision regarding a case in
Baltimore that determined the city had no right to bar any taxpaying citizens from public
supported places. The decision augured well for Alsup and the other plaintiffs. Lawyers
for the city contended that Spa Beach and Pool operated on a proprietary basis and
allowing blacks to use the facility would damage its ability to turn a profit, thus
differentiating the situation in St. Petersburg from the one in Baltimore. The federal
District Court disagreed. “The capacity in which the city operates its swimming pool and
beach is immaterial,” explained Judge George A. Whitehurst before ruling in favor of the
plaintiffs. On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit Court in New Orleans
upheld the lower court‟s decision, stating: “It is no answer that the beach and pool cannot
4

Evening Independent, 1985; Enoch Davis, On the Bethel Trail (St. Petersburg: Valkyrie Press, Inc. 1979),
68-69; St. Petersburg Times, April 25, 1947, and August 22, 1955.
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be operated at a profit on a nonsegregated basis, and that the city will be forced to close
the pool. .Unfortunate as closing the pool may be, that furnishes no ground for abridging
the rights of the appellees to its use without discrimination on the grounds of race so long
as it is operated.” The U.S Supreme Court refused to hear the case and in April 1957 the
original ruling became official. 6
Despite the legal victory, blacks stayed away from Spa until 1958. While
members of the CCC may have been free from white reprisals, the average black citizen
had little to gain and a lot to lose from thumbing his nose at the city‟s white power
structure; even if they had won the right to use Spa in federal court. The CCC,
meanwhile, attempted to desegregate the seating on public buses. Just as Alsup v. St.
Petersburg had gone to court in 1955, civil rights leaders in Alabama had begun the
Montgomery Bus Boycott. Largely credited with kickstarting the modern American civil
rights movement, the boycott and an accompanying lawsuit eventually secured an
injunction against segregated bus seating policies in Alabama. Months later, a bus
boycott in Florida successfully ended the discriminatory practice in Tallahassee, the state
capital. In a meeting with Ross Windom, CCC cofounder and long time social activist
Rev. Enoch Davis, along with Rev. Ben Wyland, urged the city manager to “avert the
possibility” of another Tallahassee by dropping the segregated seating policy. Although
no local ordinance ordered a separation of the races on public transit, Windom called
their bluff and elected to preserve the tradition. Instead of a bus boycott, desegregation
efforts returned to the beach and pool. 7
5

St. Petersburg Times, September 22, 1955; and Paulson, “Stay Out,” 9.
St. Petersburg Times, November 7, 1955; and Paulson, “Stay Out,” 10.
7
Glenda A. Rabby, The Pain and the Promise: The Struggle For Civil Rights in Tallahassee, Florida
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1999), 3; St. Petersburg Times, April 27, 1956, June 13, 1956.
6
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The dormant Spa controversy awakened in June 1958 when eight black teenagers
and college students bought tickets to the beach and went for a swim. The incident turned
into a spectacle when a half dozen reporters and photographers showed up. After only
thirty minutes the swimmers came ashore, gave interviews, used the showers, and left. 8
What appeared not to bother white swimmers at the time eventually caused a local
firestorm. When word of the incident reached city leaders, an outraged Windom shut
down the facility. For three days police officers kept people out. Windom reopened Spa
on June 7, and the next day a young black man, David Isom, paid his way into the pool
area and swam unabated for more than an hour. Again Windom closed it down.
Following the incident the city council, adhering to the “as long as it is operated by the
city” portion of the appellate judgment, voted to close Spa down for the rest of the
summer.9
Ross Windom and the city council found themselves in a precarious position.
Keeping Spa closed was bad for business. But according to their logic, so was an
integrated swimming facility. The city‟s old nostrum of quelling such a controversy with
a search for a new segregated beach for blacks returned. To the dismay of Fred Alsup and
Enoch Davis, the city council set aside $15,000 for the construction of an all-black beach
in the northernmost part of the city, along the Gandy causeway, an area inaccessible to
most of its intended users. The standoff was becoming more contentious. Rather than risk
a mingling of the races, city officials were fostering social and economic turmoil. 10
As the summer beach season came to a close and students returned to school,
8

New York Times, June 6,1958; Deposition, Papers of the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
9
Ibid; St. Petersburg Times, June 9, 1958; and Paulson, “Stay Out,” 12.
10
Ibid., 13.
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Windom quietly reopened Spa in early September. A day passed without incident. But on
September 4, a black teenage girl went for a swim at the beach. This time Windom took a
different approach. “I realize that Negroes through court action have secured the legal
right to use Spa Pool and Beach,” he said, but “we cannot escape from the reality that
long established custom provides for separation of the races in recreational facilities.”
Mayor Burroughs, echoing the city manager‟s sentiments, urged black residents to
“cooperate with us in an effort to continue our good relationship.” The patronizing pleas
fell upon deaf ears. Days later, another swim-in led the city council to close Spa
indefinitely. In addition, the council took punitive measures and decided to use the
money set aside for the proposed Gandy beach (for blacks) to develop an all-white beach
in the North Shore area of the city.11
At this point, the protracted controversy had already begun to draw the ire of
influential factions throughout the city. Downtown, merchants and hotel proprietors
worried about rising racial tensions and a closed beach that threatened the tourism
industry. The major media outlets stepped up the pressure, but from different sides of the
debate. While the St. Petersburg Times endorsed reopening Spa on an integrated basis
and chastised city administrators for letting the situation deteriorate, the St. Petersburg
Evening Independent stood by the city manager and the mayor, suggesting tourists would
rather vacation elsewhere if the city desegregated its swimming facilities. Local clergy
groups pleaded with the city manager to soften his stance. But Windom, who once vowed
not be the person “that integrated St. Petersburg,” refused to budge. 12
As the political pressure built and the din of public frustration intensified,
11
12

St. Petersburg Times, September 5, 1958, September 16, 1958.
St. Petersburg Times, September 20, 1958; and Paulson, “Stay Out,” 14-15.
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Windom and Burroughs played their last card. Since 1953 the city had flirted with the
idea of building a cultural center, and hiring an engineering analysis firm out of New
York to survey the best the location for such a project. Twice, once in 1953 and again in
1957, the firm recommended that the city should build the proposed cultural center at the
present location of the Alfred Whitted airpark, on a patch of land along the waterfront.
After sitting on the project for more than a year, Burroughs suddenly suggested razing
Spa Pool and building the cultural center in its place. Several downtown merchants
immediately endorsed the idea, encouraging Burroughs, who a year earlier
enthusiastically endorsed the Whitted airpark site, to hold “pep rallies” to garner support.
Meanwhile, Windom flew around the country conferring with engineers involved with
similar projects.13
Despite Burrough‟s and Windom‟s efforts, several city councilmen, the Council
Of Neighborhood Associations (CONA), the St. Petersburg Planning Board, and the St.
Petersburg Times all came out against the project. CONA president G. Harris Graham
criticized the proposal as “slapped together,” and called for a “30 day cooling off period,”
lest the city act impetuously. For much of the opposition the concern was more fiscal than
racial or political. When it became clear that a cultural center was too big and too costly,
a revised plan called for the building of a “geodesic dome” auditorium for an estimated
$450,000. Incensed, Graham threatened to circulate a petition to block construction,
claiming most of the citizenry does not “want an auditorium--they want sewers and street
lights.”14
In early November, the city‟s efforts to prevent the integration of Spa began to
13
14

St. Petersburg Times, September 9, 1958, September 19, 1958.
St. Petersburg Times, October 11, 1958, September 18, 1958...
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unravel. First, the engineering firm Rader and Associates offered to build the auditorium
for the elevated figure of $1.2 million. For people like Graham, support now seemed
utterly out of the question. Still, city council members decided to move forward with the
auditorium. A few days later, Windom unexpectedly announced his resignation. St.
Petersburg‟s longest serving City Manager gave no reason for his abrupt departure. The
final nail in the coffin came when CONA issued a petition that bearing signatures from
7,767 registered voters, more than the ten percent needed to send the auditorium
controversy before the electorate.15
Before a referendum could be held the city council abandoned the plan.
Subsequently, the council voted to reopen Spa with the condition that acting City
Manager Verlyn Fletcher had the authority to close it “should an emergency arise.” The
beach and pool remained open from that point on. A 160-acre site at the city‟s North
Shore became the new site for the proposed auditorium, bringing a quiet end to the long
fight over Spa. And yet only the beginning of the struggle to desegregate the public
sphere.16
By 1960 the hope of a rapid dismantling of the Jim Crow system in the South had
faded. Desegregation efforts had met with massive white resistance and a rising tide of
race-baiting political demagoguery. While the American economy boomed, white-flight
in the North, disfranchisement in the South, and discrimination throughout the country,
kept millions of black Americans economically impoverished. Although the dream of full
racial equality was deferred, civil rights activists were consoled by the passage of two
civil rights bills (1957 and 1960) and the Eisenhower administration‟s deployment of
15
16

St. Petersburg Times, November 7, 1958, January 28, 1959.
Miami News, January 6, 1959; St. Petersburg Times, January 14, 1959.
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federal troops in Arkansas during the Central High School desegregation crisis. Such
developments “legitimized” the black struggle and “prepared the way for a more massive
and militant phase.” With faith in the legalistic means flagging the fight moved to the
streets. The next “phase” of the movement began in Greensboro, North Carolina, in
February 1960, when four black North Carolina A&T students conducted a sit-in at a
Woolworth‟s lunch counter. Within weeks the sit-ins had spread to a number of cities,
including St. Petersburg.17
Black civil rights activists in St. Petersburg (hoping to encourage city leaders to
form a biracial committee) conducted two days of sit-ins in early March. On the second,
C. Bette Wimbish and Gibbs Jr. College student Theodore Floyd sat in at the William
Henry lunch counter. J.P. Moses and Rev. Dr. H. McDonald did the same at the Maas
Bros. department store. Two unidentified black males sat in at the S.H. Kress lunch
counter. In each case, the black activists were refused service, and the lunch counters
immediately closed. “We were told they couldn‟t serve us because of the existing state
and county laws,” said J.P Moses. In fact, the state‟s legal position gave proprietors
operating public accommodations the right to serve anyone they pleased. Unlike the
situation in the Deep South, local or state law existed that specifically prevented white
establishments from serving blacks.18
More sit-ins occurred the next day. This time, Theodor Floyd and close to
thirty other college students took the demonstrations to Webb‟s City, “the world‟s
largest variety store.” For twenty minutes the group waited by the turnstiles for
“counter checks,” access passes to the lunch counter area. When employees from
17
18

Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle For Black Equality (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981), 35-36.
St. Petersburg Times, March 3, 1960.
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Webb‟s informed Floyd the store had run out of counter checks, the
demonstrators moved on to S.H. Kress. The story there was the same. Kress
closed its counters and waited for the students to leave. 19
Unlike in Tallahassee, St. Petersburg‟s first brush with lunch counter
desegregation barely registered on the social barometer. Everyone- from activists
to waitresses to white customers and police officers- remained calm and civil.
Business owners, however, took notice. Webb‟s City owner, Doc Webb, issued a
written statement that blamed the sit-ins on outside agitators. Webb, who
employed more than 100 blacks but in the lowliest positions, considered himself
“a friend” of the black community and believed the” demonstrations were
condoned,” by only “a few of the city‟s Negroes.” Later, when demonstrations
returned to Webb‟s City, Webb-once again took a paternalistic posture that
refused to acknowledge the necessity of change. 20
Despite Webb‟s bewilderment, the sit-ins appeared to work. Mayor
Brantley initially balked at the idea of a biracial committee, saying: “There is no
need to appoint a committee for the purpose of alleviating a condition that does
not in fact exist.” But pressure from an interracial group of clergymen led
Brantley to reconsider. “It might be well to have a biracial committee to assist in
continuing the present relationship and understanding that does exist,” he later
acknowledged. The creation of such a committee in Tampa had already led to a
19
20

St. Petersburg Times, March 4, 1960.
St. Petersburg Times, March 5, 1960.
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moratorium on sit-in demonstrations, and leaders in St. Petersburg hoped for a
similar outcome. 21
As negotiations over lunch counter desegregation began, black leaders
shifted their focus to education. Six years after the Brown decision students in St.
Petersburg and throughout most of Pinellas County still attended racially separate
schools. As part of the state‟s plan to circumvent the Brown decision, individual
school districts were given expansive powers to dictate the pace of desegregation.
Instead of complying, the Pinellas County Board of Public Instruction acted as if,
in the words of historian Gordon K. Mantler, “separate but really equal” would
suffice. The county built new segregated schools and rejected black applicants to
all-white institutions. 22
Brown did, however, resuscitate the local NAACP branch, which in its
early years had had concentrated on voter registration. When Ralph Wimbish
became branch president in 1959, the St. Petersburg NAACP took the lead in
local desegregation efforts. A graduate of Gibbs High School, Wimbish received
a bachelor‟s degree from Florida A&M College and an M.D. from Meharry
Medical College. In 1952, Wimbish, along with his wife C. Bette, returned to St.
Petersburg and the couple almost immediately dove into social activism. While
his wife led voter registration drives, Ralph formed the Ambassador‟s Club, a
fraternal society that listed the most prominent and wealthy members of the black
community on its roster. After helping initiate the CCC, Wimbish and a few
21

St. Petersburg Times, April 15, 1960.
C. Bette Wimbish, interview by Barbara Mott, November 7, 1994; Gordon K. Mantler, “I‟m Against the
It is Being Done: School Desegregation and Civility in Pinellas County, Florida” (master‟s thesis,
University of South Florida, 2002), 50.
22
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fellow members challenged the segregation policies at the Pasadena Golf Course
in 1954. Rather than integrate the course, local leaders sold it to private owners. 23
Six years later, though still smarting from the Pasadena episode, the
Wimbishes developed an innovative political approach to school desegregation. If
they could not force the school board to comply with Brown, they would integrate
the school board first. On March 5, 1960 C. Bette Wimbish announced her
candidacy for the “at-large” seat on the Pinellas County Board of Public
Instruction. The “Wimbish for School Board” campaign was the first of its kind in
Pinellas County. Never before had a black candidate run for a countywide
political office. Operating out of the NAACP offices on 22nd St. S., Wimbish was
well-suited to challenging the white hegemony in county politics. Having earned a
degree from Florida A&M University, before doing graduate work at the
University of Pennsylvania, and having worked as an teacher in the Hillsborough
County School system, she had strong credentials as an educator. Moreover, she
“had no fears of reprisals.” “No one could do anything to me,” she remembered,
“my husband was a physician, self-sustained in the black community.” 24
From the start, Wimbish “knew” she could not win. But she hoped to
establish a political beachhead and to disrupt traditional arrangements, If only by
using “the campaign process to access places like parks during rallies that blacks
were not permitted to go.” Wimbish ran on a platform opposed to the practice of
“duplicate spending,” the doubly excessive cost of funding racially separate
23

St. Petersburg Times, December 18, 1960, June 2, 1954; Ellen Babb, “We Took the Leadership Away.”
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schools. But considering herself “a mother first and foremost,” she fought a larger
fight for her children and those in the black community who had no “chance.” 25
Despite receiving nearly 10,000 votes in the primary, Wimbish failed to
unseat the incumbent, Dr. William Casler of Clearwater. While she fell far short
of Casler‟s 25,000 votes, her vote revealed pockets of progressivism throughout
the county. Blacks only composed 3,798 of the registered voters in the county
which means more than 6,000 whites cast votes for Wimbish. With more than
70% of her support coming from white voters, she considered the race “a moral
victory,” a “path finding effort” that will make it much “easier for those that
follow.”26
The success sparked a greater concentration on voter registration within
the local black community, as Wimbish and her supporters set out to register as
many new voters as they could before the November elections. The Non-partisan
Voters League kicked off a house-to-house canvass to reach those whose jobs
prevented them from getting to the registrar‟s office during the day. Although St.
Petersburg‟s black voters failed to determine any elections, the November return
revealed the possibility of increasing the black electorate unprecedented levels. In
1960, a significant number of St. Petersburg blacks switched to the Republican
Party to vote for a moderate gubernatorial candidate, George C. Petersen, who
was challenging the Democrat Farris Bryant, an arch segregationist. In Pinellas
24
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precinct 61, home to 1,247 black voters and only 114 whites, Petersen nearly
doubled Bryant‟s tally of 255 votes. Statewide Bryant won the election handily
and soon set out to separate himself from the outgoing Governor Leroy Collins.
As Governor, Bryant failed to reactivate Collin‟s state biracial committee and
reaffirmed his opposition to racial integration at every opportunity. 27
The presidential election was a different story. The black voters who
backed Petersen at the state level preferred the Democratic presidential candidate
John F. Kennedy over Republican Richard M. Nixon. With blacks across the
nation throwing their support behind Kennedy, the Democrat eked out a narrow
victory.
By the winter of 1960 racial progress seemed at a standstill. The biracial
committee had met only a few times and done nothing, and Brantley‟s stipulation
that the committee act only as a mediating body rendered it almost powerless. In
October, officials from Woolworth‟s, Kress, and McCrory‟s announced the
integration of their lunch counters in Bradenton, Largo, Sarasota, Tampa, and Fort
Myers, which only crystallized the St. Petersburg biracial committee‟s
ineffectiveness. The only active racial issue involved efforts to reform the city‟s
hospital facilities.28
Since January 1960, city officials had been exploring ways of improving
local hospital facilities. City Manager George K. Armes organized a committee of
the city‟s leading physicians to survey the deficiencies plaguing the all-black
Mercy Hospital and to recommend solutions. The hospital, built in 1926, routinely
27
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fell short of covering its monthly operating costs, because of inadequate health
insurance in the black community. On average, those admitted to Mercy carried
policies paying anywhere between three and fifteen dollars a day, well below the
$30/day the typical patient cost the hospital. Furthermore, Mercy lacked proper
instruments, bed space, and adequate staffing. The x-ray machines were
unreliable, and doctors at Mercy often endured long waits to secure blood from
the blood bank at the whites-only Mound Park Hospital. When Armes‟
investigative committee recommended building a new, racially segregated Mercy
hospital adjacent to Mound Park, the city council concurred, voting to spend $1.7
million for the construction of the new unit. 29
What initially seemed like a simple solution, and to city administrators, an
admirable gesture towards the black community, soon became a source of
contention and foot dragging. For nine months groups with competing interests
fought tooth and nail over the proper handling of the “Mercy situation.” The
Mound Park Advisory Board-essentially a white citizen‟s council with a more
official sounding name-opposed the investigative committee‟s proposal, arguing
for the remodeling of Mercy on its present site. 30
When it looked as though the city was going to bend to the Advisory
Board‟s demands, black doctors sent a letter to city council threatening to
“boycott Mercy.” They even vowed to send their patients to Mound Park if the
Advisory Board got its way. “We are well aware of the procedure of the city
fathers in previous years,” the letter read, “give the Negroes a little and they will
28
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quiet down for 10 or 15 years.” Forewarned, Armes and the city council went
back to the drawing board and eventually agreed to add an integrated wing to
Mound Park while continuing to keep Mercy open. In response, the all-white
Mound Park Civic Association condemned the new plan and circulated a petition
to block all hospital integration. Unsure how to proceed, the city council promised
to come up with a new plan by the first of the year. Black doctors formulated a
boycott strategy and took a “wait and see stand.” Ralph Wimbish and the NAACP
were heartened by the doctor‟s stand, but the NAACP was preoccupied with other
issues at the time.31
In November 1960, the NAACP and the CCC planned a selective buying
campaign to protest lunch counter segregation and the discriminatory policies at
department stores. National NAACP executive secretary Roy Wilkins had
encouraged branches to conduct “patronage withdrawals” against chain and
variety stores throughout the spring, but the St. Petersburg branch did not respond
to his plea until November. With the Christmas shopping season already in full
swing, the air was ripe for such a project. An executive committee composed of
leaders from the NAACP and the CCC outlined a list of “target stores.” The
NAACP also planned to bolster the campaign with-direct action demonstrations
that would involve the formation of youth council involved. After getting a taste
of the sit-ins in March, local college and high school students had grown restless.
During the summer, Gibbs high graduate David Isom, fed up with the
conservative NAACP leadership, formed an “unofficial” youth council, and led
30
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sporadic swim-ins at Spa Beach and several lunch counter sit-ins. Isom left for
college in September and the youth council fell apart. In preparation for the
upcoming demonstrations, NAACP member Leon Cox Jr. organized the branch‟s
first “official” youth council. To the dismay of Gibbs Jr. College president
Jonathon Rembert, Cox, a professor of political science, recruited volunteers from
his classes.32
When rumors leaked of the plans in St. Petersburg, the Congress of Racial
Equality joined the fold. CORE‟s newest Florida chapter formed in the living
room of Ike Williams, one of St. Petersburg‟s two black attorneys, during a
meeting between CCC officials and CORE field secretary Richard Haley.
Although a significant force in movements in Miami and Tallahassee, CORE
struggled to gain traction in St. Petersburg. As much as the white establishment,
black leaders resented encroachment from outside organizations. After its
formation, CORE joined the selective buying campaign in a limited capacity, and,
along with the youth council, supplied the bulk of the demonstrators for the direct
action protests.33
To spread the word and garner support for the upcoming campaign, the
NAACP held rallies at churches and in vacant lots throughout the black
community. On November 27, the patronage withdrawal from select stores began,
followed days later by direct-action protests. On the first day of demonstrations
32
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there was “a buzz around Gibbs high,” remembered one volunteer, “. . .who was
going, where is everyone meeting beforehand?” Around 5 p.m. on December 2,
close to 30 protesters picketed Webb‟s City, and another 15 demonstrators waved
signs and passed out handbills at Maas. Bros. Inside Webb‟s, protesters sat in at
the lunch counters. In front of “counter closed” signs, next to white customers
sipping coffee, black bus boys collecting dirty dishes from white patrons, Theodor
Floyd of CORE and NAACP Youth Council president Ted Lockhart were denied
service. That evening, picketers targeted white-owned liquor stores in the black
community, protesting discriminatory hiring policies. 34
For three days the demonstrations continued. Although picketers heard the
occasional racial epithet, they received little in the way of physical affronts.
Waitresses at the lunch counters refused to serve the black customers, but never
asked them to leave and did not make a scene. At one point, the police got
involved when several sign-toting youths burst through the doors of Webb‟s City.
In a deposition taken later, Doc Webb claimed the picketers “shoved and jostled”
customers and threatened black employees with bodily harm. One man in the
melee, Jack Morrison Jr., went to jail for blocking the entrance to Webb‟s and not
letting customers pass. On another occasion, former Ku Klux Klan Wizard Bill
Hendrix arrived in St. Petersburg pulling a trailer with “signs depicting tribal
Negroes in Africa” and the words “get out of town‟” written on the side. Chief
Purdy caught up with Hendrix before he reached downtown and asked him to turn
34
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around. After a few exchanges, Hendrix told Purdy that he would “make a fine
Klansman,” and left town.35
Regardless of Purdy‟s alleged Klan qualifications, he and his men played a large
role in keeping the peace. Since becoming chief in 1958, Purdy had helped repair the
historically troubled relationship between the black community and a mostly white police
force. To handle the demonstrations, Purdy sent only black officers to the scene, keeping
white patrolmen on backup alert. The mild nature of the demonstrations required little
police intervention, and the officers wisely refrained from provoking a confrontation. 36
Nevertheless, an enraged Doc Webb single-handily ended the protests. By noon
on December 7, Webb‟s attorney had obtained a restraining order against the NAACP
and within an hour the protests at Webb‟s City came to a halt. Citing the loss of $45,000
in revenue during what Webb considered “malicious and violent” picketing, the
injunction dealt the selective buying campaign a mortal blow. The demonstrations at
Maas. Bros. ended the next day. NAACP lawyers Fred Minnis and Ike Williams
immediately filed a motion to dissolve the injunction, and Williams warned that the
picketing would resume if negotiations failed to reach a settlement. 37
Like Doc Webb, city leaders had seen enough. Biracial committee chair Dr. Earl
Edington convened a series of negotiations between chain store proprietors and NAACP
executives that finally led to a settlement. To avoid the perception that outsiders
influenced the situation, both sides agreed to wait a few weeks, until January 3, to
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announce the desegregation of the lunch counters. The NAACP ended all demonstrations
but kept the selective buying campaign active until the first of the year. Days later
NAACP State conference president A. Leon Lowry almost ruined everything. In a press
release, Lowry celebrated the “NAACP‟s successful” campaign in St. Petersburg--exactly
the type of imputation leaders of both sides hoped to avoid. Lowry‟s misstep, however,
proved harmless. 38
On January 3, 1961, fifteen stores in greater St. Petersburg, including Kress,
Maas. Bros., and Woolworth‟s, dropped their segregation policies. Webb‟s City followed
suit the same day. Fannye Ayer Ponder, Ruth McClellan, and Enoch received invitations
to lunch at Webb‟s City. Webb, however, pressed on with an injunctive suit against the
NAACP to, in his words, “prove a point.” Circuit Court Judge Jack White denied the
NAACP‟s motion to dissolve the injunction, forcing them to scramble to find the money
for an appeal. Minnis contacted the NAACP Legal Defense Fund for help. Upon
reviewing the details, Defense Fund attorney Robert L. Carter believed the case “was one
of the best” the NAACP would “get in this kind of situation,” and agreed to foot the
$2,500 appeal fee and fly to St. Petersburg to assist.39
As the racial tension seemed to ease, the hotels began to fill in anticipation of
spring training baseball, presenting a glaring dilemma for Ralph Wimbish. For years he
and other black leaders had helped find lodgings for black professional baseball players
in town for spring training. As the most visible leader of the local struggle, Wimbish
could not “battle for the integration of lunch counters with one hand,” as he explained at
a press conference, “and further the cause of segregation by arranging separate housing
38
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with the other.” Spring training baseball, however, was a tradition in St. Petersburg
almost as old as segregation itself, and few city leaders and hotel proprietors felt the need
for change. 40
The first Major League Baseball teams arrived in St. Petersburg in 1914. By
1961, thirteen of the league‟s eighteen teams trained in Florida, seven in the Tampa Bay
area, including the New York Yankees and the St. Louis Cardinals in St. Petersburg.
Long after the desegregation of Major League Baseball in 1947, writes historian Jack
Davis, “racial policies in the spring training season continued to reflect Southern social
patterns.” In St. Petersburg, white players for both teams stayed on the waterfront at the
Vinoy Hotel or at the Soreno. Black players, on the other hand, rented rooms from dentist
Robert Swain at the James Motel; others, including all-star catcher Elston Howard, stayed
with the Wimbishes. And the segregated atmosphere did not stop there: the stadiums had
segregated seating sections, restaurants and night clubs, social gatherings and recreational
facilities banned black players, even those who were household names across the country.
For white teammates, the several weeks in Florida were vacation time, but for black
players, it was often a sort of penance. 41
State NAACP officials gave Wimbish full support and sent letters to teams
training in Florida, urging an “end to the problem of racial bias.” Although teams trained
all across the southern part of the state, everyone waited to see what the Yankees would
do. “If the St. Petersburg hotels had given in to Dan Topping‟s demands,” said one
39
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hospitality executive, “we would have followed suit.” New York general manager Dan
Topping met with the St. Petersburg chamber of commerce and hotel management to
work out a “one-roof” solution, but no hotel would budge. Major League Baseball
refused to get involved, putting little pressure on the state to intervene, essentially leaving
the policies intact. White players stayed at the Vinoy and Soreno hotels anyway. 42
While most teams waited till the following season to address the problem, several
bucked the trend. When the White Sox, who trained in Sarasota, traveled to Miami to
play the Orioles, their president, Bill Veeck, canceled his club‟s reservations at the
McAllister Hotel when it would not allow his black players. Soon after, the Braves
integrated the seating at their stadium in Bradenton and removed racially discriminatory
signs from the facility. The following year many teams, including the Cardinals and the
incoming New York Mets, secured integrated housing. St. Petersburg‟s Al Lang Stadium
integrated the grandstands for spring training in 1962, but many of the city‟s hotels
continued to ban black guests.43
After the dissolution of the selective buying campaign movement leaders put the
brakes on desegregation efforts to focus on securing more job opportunities for the black
community. The election of Mayor Herman Goldner in 1961 represented a step in that
direction. During his campaign, Goldner had promised to hire more blacks in civil jobs
like meter-readers and bus drivers, and to reform the city‟s biracial committee, which had
gone defunct when the lunch counters desegregated. “As long as the climate and
atmosphere of St. Petersburg is one of positive action-and that appears to be the case,”
41
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explained NAACP executive Louis O. Harper, “the [NAACP] intends to try to negotiate
further gains without en masse protests. . .” The easing of tensions came as the broader
civil rights movement heated up. Sit-ins and other forms of direct action protests had
revived massive resistance throughout the South, and the racial tensions would only
intensify over the next two years--even in cities like St. Petersburg where movement
leader seemed to favor diplomatic solutions to their social qualms. Indeed, as the baseball
players and snowbirds headed north, a new form of agitation threatened St. Petersburg‟s
peaceful interregnum. 44
In May 1961, direct-action forms of civil disobedience went on the road. After the
Supreme Court extended a 1946 decision (Morgan v. Virginia) banning segregation on
interstate traveling buses to cover terminals (Boynton v. Virginia), CORE organized the
Freedom Rides. Aboard Greyhound and Trailways buses, black and white civil rights
activists trained in Gandhian nonviolence rode through the Deep South, testing the
region‟s compliance with the new ruling. After the first wave of rides ended were
disrupted by Klansman and other white supremacist hoodlums in Anniston and
Birmingham, Alabama, student activists in Nashville, Tennessee, picked up where the
CORE riders left off. The Nashville Riders, consisting mainly of students from Fisk and
Tennessee State Universities, rode into the heart of darkness as far as Mississippi. Forced
to respond to the violent beatings of defenseless Freedom Riders in Montgomery and
Birmingham, the Kennedy administration made a deal with Mississippi Senator James
Eastland that the Defense Department would allow law enforcement officials to arrest the
riders as long as they were protected from mob violence. Kennedy had ridden into office
43
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on a wave of black support, but his preoccupation with Cold War foreign policy led him
to neglect the black freedom struggle and to view the Freedom Rides as a diversion from
Cold War imperatives. 45
Historians credit the Freedom Rides with reinvigorating the black civil rights
movement and exposing the depth of racism in the Deep South, but at a cost. The
Kennedy administration‟s reluctant and ultimately ineffectual action to protect the Riders
emboldened white extremists and alienated black leaders. Moreover, the Freedom Riders,
as historian Raymond Arsenault has pointed out, “evoked vivid memories of meddling
abolitionists and invading armies.” “This was especially true in the white South,”
explains Arsenault, “where a resurgent „siege mentality‟ was in full force in the postBrown era.”46
By the time word of impending Freedom Rides to Florida reached Governor
Bryant in June, the movement had peaked. Nevertheless, Bryant sent an aid to warn
targeted cities, suggesting the Riders should be left alone. As in the past, the fear of
outside agitators extended to black leaders, too. In St. Petersburg, the NAACP “didn‟t
want outside groups to come in and do things local groups could do.” A “quiet check” of
the bus terminals revealed no problems. The Freedom Riders came anyway. Two buses
road into St. Petersburg on June 15, the first about 1 p.m., carrying seven Freedom
Riders, three whites and four blacks. More than two hundred spectators showed up at the
Greyhound station to witness their arrival. Chief Purdy felt “a busload of people. . .does
not in itself constitute an emergency situation,” yet he stationed trained riot police at the
44
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terminal. As the Riders disembarked from the bus, local resident Robert Bierl unleashed a
string of verbal taunts. After repeated warnings, officers eventually arrested him. The
incident with Bierl, however, was an anomaly. “The trip was very successful,”
commented Francis Randall, a white Rider and history professor from Columbia
University, “there was much less opposition, much less refusal of service than I
expected.”47
Freedom Riders in Tallahassee and Ocala were not so lucky. Law enforcement
officials in the state capital defied the governor, accusing the Riders-an interracial group
of Protestant ministers and two Jewish Rabbis-of inciting a mob, and took them to jail. In
Ocala, a fight led to several arrests. Stops in Gainesville and Tampa on the other hand,
met with no resistance. On his experiences in Florida, a Freedom Rider remarked: “I
gained a greater respect and greater understanding for the South and recognize that what
happened in Birmingham was not representative of Southern attitudes.”Two days after a
“workshop” at Rev. Enoch Davis‟s Second Bethel Baptist Church, where the Freedom
Riders reactivated the local CORE chapter, the outside agitators hopped a flight home to
New York.48
Hoping to calm the storm wrought by the Freedom Riders, the Justice Department
urged national civil rights leaders to focus their efforts on the franchise. The NAACP,
CORE, SNCC, and SCLC all began voter registration projects throughout the South,
including St. Petersburg, where leaders had already proclaimed a halt to direct-action
demonstrations. For the rest of the summer the revived CORE chapter and NAACP youth
47
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council concentrated on voter registration. 49
***
Not everyone in the NAACP agreed with the executive council‟s decision to halt
direct-action protests. Since the end of the selective buying campaign, Leon Cox had
envisioned the Youth Council picketing the segregated movie theaters downtown. When
Cox replaced Wimbish as branch president, he got his opportunity. 50
Five of St. Petersburg‟s eight movie theaters catered to blacks customers. In fact,
one of the nicest theaters in town, Park Theater, with air conditioning and central heat,
cushioned leather chairs, carpeted aisles, had integrated a year earlier. But three
downtown theaters-the Center, State, and Florida-only allowed whites.51
To prepare for the demonstrations, the youth council received training in
nonviolent direct-action. Cox appointed Gibbs Junior College student Arnette Doctor
Youth Council president, replacing Ted Lockhart, who had clashed with Cox over the
direction the group would take in the aftermath of the selective buying campaign. Doctor
could not have been more enthusiastic about Cox‟s plans, though he “didn‟t believe in
nonviolence.” As a kid growing up in the dilapidated, crime ridden, Jordan Park public
housing community, Doctor developed a deep distrust for whites--one instilled in him by
his mother. Philomena Doctor had fled from Rosewood, Florida, in 1923 during one of
the state‟s worst episodes of racial violence. From a young age Doctor learned of his
family‟s travails and kept the stories close to his heart, harboring little patience for
indignities suffered at the hands of white people. Nevertheless, Doctor believed the
49
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movement was “more important” than himself and did his best to remain nonviolent. 52
On January 11, 1962, more than twenty youths, boys dressed in slacks and sport
coats, girls in skirts and blouses, stood in line at the segregated theaters downtown,
holding signs and attempting to purchase tickets. The harmless demonstrations did little
more than irritate theater managers, though some Youth Council members reported
verbal abuse and a few claimed to have been spit upon. But most whites simply ignored
them. On one occasion at the Florida Theater a few whites bought tickets for the
demonstrators, but the theater would not honor them, offering a refund not admission. For
nearly ten days Doctor and his band shook off the humiliation and resisted temptations to
retaliate. But on January 19, the center would not hold. 53
At the Center Theater, the only place in town showing “King of Kings,” the story
of Christ, theater staff had erected an eight-foot barrier to block the entrance. Around
7:30 p.m., usher Cecil Fernandez Jr. removed a chain to allow a line of whites into the
theatre. Seizing the opportunity, demonstrators barreled through the aperture and scaled
the wrought iron barrier, knocking Fernandez into a fence and cutting his hand. Another
usher, William Fuerst, did his best to hold back the surging crowd, but several slipped by,
plowing through the ticket line. 54
In the melee a white man in his sixties approached Doctor wielding a .45 caliber
revolver and placed the barrel of the gun to his head. “Nigger,” the man shouted, “if you
don‟t get your ass out of here, your brains are gonna be splattered all over the sidewalk.”
52
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From the corner of his eye Doctor saw police officers, but they just looked on. As he
stared the man, images of Rosewood running through his head, Doctor reached for a
pistol tucked in his back pocket. But Doctor thought better of the potential deadly move
and pulled his hand away. Moments later, police clad in riot gear moved in, and Doctor‟s
assailant disappeared into the night. Within a few minutes law enforcement had the
situation under control. But before officers loaded him into a paddy wagon along with the
rest of the male demonstrators, Doctor passed his weapon off to one of the female
demonstrators that the police had allowed to go home. Ten Youth Council membersArnette Doctor, Artis Livingston, Jimmy L. Swain, Harvey L. Hammonds, Earl Williams,
Ruby L. Hollins, Vernon Kearns, Joseph W. Lampkins, Eli C. Williams, and Titus A.
Robinson-were released on $500 bond with trials set for later that month. 55
NAACP field secretary Robert Saunders called the arrests the “worst kind of
apartheid” in meeting at Second Bethel Baptist Church. Saunders vowed to keep the
demonstrations alive, urging others to join in and promising “as sure as night follows day,
the Negro shall be allowed to sit. . . in St. Petersburg theaters.” But contrary to
Saunders‟s prediction, the arrests actually doomed the demonstrations. 56
At the trials, city prosecutor Allan Weiss argued that the demonstrators‟ behavior
constituted a breach of the peace. Police Sgt. George Brown confirmed Weiss‟s claim,
saying the situation had bordered on a “riot.” The ten defendants, represented by
attorneys Fred Minnis and Ike Williams, denied the charges. In his closing statement,
Minnis remarked: “If you strip this case of all subterfuge it would simply be whether or
54
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not it is. . . disorderly act for a Negro to seek to see King of Kings. . . the only place it is
being shown in the area.”57
Initially, Municipal Judge Henry Esteva fined the defendants $50 each, but he
later suspended the fines when Minnis promised the “harassment” would cease. Judge
Esteva‟s ruling only pertained to the ten defendants, but the NAACP, almost bankrupted
by the legal fees, could not afford to continue the demonstrations. 58
The disastrous end to the picketing fractured the local movement. Pressured by
school board Superintendent Floyd T. Christian, Gibbs Junior College President Jonathan
Rembert fired Cox and stripped Doctor of his scholarship. By September, Cox had left
for a job at Fisk University in Nashville, Tennessee. In his final months as NAACP
president, Cox led a countywide voter registration drive and officially requested the city
of St. Petersburg to enact “ a bill that will ensure all of the citizens of St. Petersburg the
rights granted every other citizen in the city.” One might ask, as Stokley Carmichael did,
“What could be more harmless. . .in any even marginally healthy society?”
Unfortunately, Mayor Goldner washed his hands of the situation: “We do not feel that it
is proper for the city to interfere with the operations of private business in this area. It is
suggested this is a matter of community conscience and the problem can best be handled
on a non-governmental level.”59
***
More than a year passed before the NAACP returned to the movie theaters. By
56

Ibid., January 22, 1962.
St. Petersburg Times, February 9, 1962.
58
Ibid.
59
Brown interview with Robert Saunders, January 14-18, 2002; Letter from Robert Saunders to A. Leon
Lowry, Saunders Papers; Arsenault, Freedom Riders, 1; Cusack interview with Arnette Doctor, June 2,
2004.
57

34

then the optimism of 1962 had vanished. Goldner‟s promises to expand job opportunities
for blacks and reactivate the city‟s biracial committee never materialized. And not only
the movie theaters retained segregation. Restaurants throughout the city, including the
cafeteria at Webb‟s City, still refused to serve black patrons. What had seemed like
“positive action” to men like Louis O. Harper in 1962 now looked like the same old “feet
dragging.”60
In the summer of 1963 the NAACP was still financially in the red, but the Youth
Council was riding high. Over six weeks, as part of the nationwide “Crusade for Voter
Registration Campaign,” Youth Council members registered 1,041 new voters, the most
in the country, earning the group an award and an invitation to the NAACP‟s national
conference in Chicago. The success also encouraged council members to take on larger
projects. When NAACP field secretary Robert Saunders shifted his focus to
desegregating the movie theaters in Tampa, the St. Petersburg youth council revived such
efforts at home. However, since the departure of Cox, the insolvent NAACP had fallen
under the control of the CCC. Rev. J.L. Fennell, former branch president and then vice
president of the CCC, had taken it upon himself to resuscitate the NAACP, and the
organization was just getting back on its feet when the issue of picketing movie theaters
resurfaced. With the NAACP‟s coffers empty and Fennell preoccupied with his pastoral
and CCC, the Youth Council received little support from the adults. 61
Fortunately, Elenora Adams stepped in to fill the leadership void. A member of
the NAACP branch since 1962 and a volunteer participant during the 1961 efforts to
60
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integrate the lunch counters, Adams took unofficial control of the Youth Council when
Leon Cox became branch president. After Cox left for Nashville and the NAACP
essentially fell apart, Adams kept the council alive and ran it independently of the CCC.
During the “Crusade for Voter Registration” she recruited white students from Florida
Presbyterian College to join the council. Adams‟ assertiveness brought success to the
registration campaign but it also soured her relationship with men like Fennell. When
NAACP and CCC executives showed tepid support for the theater idea, Adams again
took matters into her own hands.62
Meanwhile, events in Tampa suggested a renewed theater picketing campaign
was imminent. On June 20, after a meeting between Robert Saunders and representatives
of Florida Theater Inc. failed to reach a settlement, the NAACP‟s Tampa branch
launched protest demonstrations. Hoping to avoid a similar situation, St. Petersburg
business and political leaders took action. First, the board of governors of the St.
Petersburg Chamber of Commerce passed a resolution calling for “all persons and
institutions to face up to the moral responsibility of equal rights for all.” In addition, four
members of the Ministerial Association and the Council of Human Relations met with
Vice Mayor Nortney Cox to discuss the hiring of more blacks in city jobs and the
necessity of a new biracial committee. “We are facing a racial crisis in our community,”
warned a minister from the Council of Human Relations in a meeting with local theater
proprietors. But the owners would not budge.63
As the demonstrations began in Tampa, the St. Petersburg NAACP branch held a
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meeting at Fennell‟s New Hope Missionary Baptist Church to vote on whether or not to
follow suit. While the executive board debated the issue downstairs, steering committee
chairpersons Elenora Adams and Howard Harris rehearsed nonviolent protest strategies
with Youth Council members upstairs. The executives voted to authorize the
demonstrations, and on June 21, 1968, a year and half after the last go around, picketers
returned to the Center, Florida, and State theaters.64
Under Adams‟s leadership, the nature of the demonstrations took on a different
tone than those in 1962. She required all participants to sign in each night before they
could demonstrate, and all newcomers had to know someone else involved or they would
not be permitted to join. Every night before picketing resumed, the Youth Council met at
New Hope Baptist to “critique” the previous night‟s activities or “reprimand individuals
for harassing the ticket seller.” Participants included middle-aged white men and women
carrying signs in one hand and holding their children‟s hands in the other. The timbre of
the demonstrations and diversity of participants, not to mention the earlier efforts of the
Chamber of Commerce, reflected the shifting winds in the city‟s racial climate. 65
Behind the scenes, groups worked tirelessly to desegregate the theaters and end
the need for protests. Consistently rebuffed by theater owners, the Council of Human
Relations formed its own interracial negotiating body. Not to be out done, Mayor
Goldner organized his own biracial committee. But in the end, neither group proved
capable of bringing the issue to a close. Quietly, and under the radar, without the
knowledge of NAACP executives, Adams and the Youth Council members met with the
Chamber of Commerce and theater owners and ultimately reached a settlement. With
63
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desegregation accomplished, Adams halted the demonstrations for good on July 26. 66
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Chapter Three: The Lawyer and the Loose Cannon
Following the integration of St. Petersburg‟s movie theaters, the focus of the
movement returned to the courtroom. In 1964, Jim Sanderlin, a young black attorney two
years out of law school, sued the Pinellas County Board of Public Instruction for failing
to comply with Brown v. Board of Education, the 1954 Supreme Court ruling outlawing
segregation. At the time, only two percent of the county‟s black students attended school
with whites. For ten years the school board had managed to avoid such a lawsuit while
thwarting all but the most token desegregation. In 1966, two years after Sanderlin filed
suit, a young black activist in St. Petersburg, Joseph A. Waller, sat in court facing the
possibility of five years in prison for an impetuous act of lawlessness. Penalized for his
militancy, Waller had been subjected to a protracted legal battle symbolized the onset of
white backlash in the late 1960s. A study in contrast, Sanderlin and Waller were the
leading voices in the local struggle for black equality. Sanderlin‟s legal activism and his
commitment to nonviolence fit well within the upper ranks of the city‟s conservative
black leadership. Waller, on the other hand, led a militant counter movement that
reflected growing dissatisfaction and frustration within the black community. 1
The rise of both men to local prominence mirrored a larger cleave in the national
civil rights narrative. Years of federal inaction and modest advances bread
disillusionment and infighting amongst movement leaders. The nonviolent struggle
peaked in 1963, when more than 200,000 people gathered on the steps of the Lincoln
Memorial as part of the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom. Three months after
the march, with Martin Luther King Jr.‟s “I have a Dream,” speech still echoing across
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the nation, President Kennedy died at the hands of an assassin. Over the next two years,
President Lyndon B. Johnson completed the work his slain predecessor had begun,
signing into law the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. More
than one hundred years after emancipation, black Americans had finally achieved civic
equality with whites, if only in the eyes of the law. 2
For many disillusioned blacks, however, it was too late. Over the next five years a
rising tide of black militancy converged with a flood of antiwar sentiment and social
unrest. Riots erupted across the country, threatening the fabric of American civilization
and endangering the myths that had for so long defined national identity. In St.
Petersburg, Sanderlin and Waller represented the diverging expressions of the black
struggle. Their parallel and oft-intertwined sagas reveal not only their triumphs and
failures as individuals, but also the shifting social and political...that framed the civil
rights struggle of the 1960s.3
***
“White and colored children shall not be taught in the same school,” read
Florida‟s 1885 constitution. Nine years later the U.S. Supreme Court validated this
provision in Plessy v. Ferguson, ruling separate facilities for blacks and whites did not
violate the “due process” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment so long as said facilities
were “equal.” Combined with the efforts of Southern legislators, who between 1880 and
1900 devised new state constitutions that effectively disfranchised blacks and poor
1
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whites, Plessy formed the legal foundation of Southern Jim Crowism for the next fiftyeight years.4
St. Petersburg‟s first black family, the Donaldsons, sent their children to school
with whites in the mid-1880s, when the community was still a frontier settlement. But as
St. Petersburg‟s population grew, Jim Crow restrictions emerged, creating the need for an
all-black school. In 1914, Davis Academy opened, followed in 1925 by Jordan
Elementary. Separate, however, was never equal. In her study of Tallahassee, Glenda
Rabby suggests the expense of operating a dual school system “contributed to the
wretched quality” of education for “both races.” Blacks, of course, suffered
disproportionately. Before the turn of the century the state spent $13.12 per black student
as compared with $26.66 for whites. By 1910, the spending gap had increased. For every
$9.95 spent on a black student, the state allocated $36.05 for white pupils. St.
Petersburg‟s poorly-funded black schools offered no more than a sixth grade education.
Students as well as instructors felt the heavy financial burdens. Teachers often canvassed
neighborhoods on foot for donations and sometimes went without paychecks in the final
months of the school year. The institutional infrastructure of black education in Florida
reached a nadir during the Great Depression. In 1932, according to a report released by
the state superintendent of schools, 24 percent of the state‟s black teachers lacked a high
school diploma, and only two percent earned more than $1,000 a year. 5
The depression had a paradoxical affect on black education in St. Petersburg. As
funding dried up, doors opened. When the city‟s economy collapsed in 1926, a planned
all-white elementary school sat empty. Local blacks successfully lobbied for use of the
4
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facility, and in 1928, the first black high school, 34th St. School for Colored (renamed
two years later to Jonathon C. Gibbs High School, after Reconstruction Florida‟s most
prominent black politician), began holding classes for grades 5-12. When it opened, the
school had no electrical lighting and the restrooms were designed for younger people.
The office of the school‟s first principal, Samuel Reed, was in a custodial closet. Gibbs
“offered the same curriculum as the white schools,” remembered former principle
Emmanuel Stewart, but with “old textbooks that had been discarded and were outdated,
old sewing machines and typewriters. . .the vocational shops were deplorable.” During
Gibbs‟s first decade, there was no school bus for black students, many of whom had to
walk miles to Gibbs, passing white schools along the way. When the school board turned
down a request to supply Gibbs with a bus in 1939, principle George W. Perkins
somehow raised the money to purchase one. Despite chronic underfunding and neglect by
the county school board, Gibbs became the pride of the black community. Students
destined to become community leaders “patterned” their lives after dedicated teachers
like Olive B. McLin, Fannye Ayer Ponder, her adopted son Ernest A. Ponder, Ruby
Wysinger, among others. By the beginning of World War II, a half dozen segregated
black schools dotted the neighborhoods of South St. Petersburg, creating an expanding
foundation for educational uplift. 6
Despite the parlous economic conditions, the New Deal provided blacks with a
measure of hope. “The Roosevelt administration,” writes historian Patricia Sullivan,
“aimed to include blacks equitably in New Deal programs administered in the South.”
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According to Sullivan, “Southern blacks began to view their plight within a national
context and appeal for federal and national support in securing justice and equal rights.” 7
One of the first blacks in St. Petersburg to take on the establishment was Noah
Griffin. In 1937, Griffin, then president of St. Petersburg‟s branch of the NAACP, and
principal of Gibbs high school, tried his hand at ending the salary disparities between
white and black teachers. At the time, black teachers in Pinellas County earned half to
one third the amount their white counterparts made. Prompted by NAACP attorney
Thurgood Marshall‟s successful challenge of unequal pay for black teachers in Maryland,
Griffin pressed the school board to change its policies. When the board ignored him,
Griffin, with the Marshall‟s help, filed a lawsuit. Though ultimately unsuccessful, the suit
made it to the Florida Supreme Court, where the justices upheld a lower court‟s decision,
ruling that there was no legal basis with which to enforce pay scales upon school districts.
To ward off other potential lawsuits, Pinellas County‟s superintendent of schools fired
Griffin and five others involved with the suit. The dismissal ended Griffin‟s career as an
educator in Florida, but this did not deter others from picking up the fight. 8
Over the next decade black educators, many affiliated with the Florida State
Teachers Association, in a wide range of Florida cities, from Pensecola to Ocala, to West
Palm Beach, successfully forced their respective school boards to increase the salaries of
black teachers. Locally, the Florida State Teacher‟s Union filed another lawsuit against
the Pinellas County school board in 1942. Finally, in 1945, the board aquiesced. By
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1952, the income for black teachers had risen to $2,922, just below the $3,195 figure for
whites.9
As Florida emerged from depression and war into postwar prosperity, the state
launched a program to improve its lagging school system. Under governor Millard
Caldwell, Florida passed the Minimum Foundations Act in 1947. Millions of dollars went
into the construction of new schools, including funds aimed at fulfilling the “equal” part
of the “separate but equal doctrine.” Before 1947, the capital outlay per student in Florida
was $2.35 for blacks and $7.24 for whites. By 1952 those expenditures had become
$68.78 and 59.84, respectively. Moreover, in 1945 the Florida board of control instituted
a plan that funded thirty to forty scholarships for black students to attend college out of
state.10
However benevolent such equalization efforts appeared to be, they mainly served
to reinforce racial segregation, in the face of impending change. In 1954, after wiping out
segregation at the graduate level four years earlier (Sweatt v. Painter/ Mclaurin v.
Oklahoma, 1950), the U.S. Supreme Court outlawed racial segregation in the nation‟s
public school system in Brown v. Board of Education. The decision came at an unusual
time in Florida politics. Governor Dan McCarty had died two years earlier and the state
was awaiting a special run-off election to replace the acting Governor Charley Johns, a
staunch segregationist from the north Florida town of Starke, considered calling a special
9
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session of the legislature to address the ruling, but decided against it, deferring to Senator
Spessard Holland, who called for “patience and moderation.”11
Upon winning the state‟s special gubernatorial election, Leroy Collins took office
six months after Brown. An avowed segregationist, Collins promised to do everything in
his power to legally avoid complying with Brown. But Collins understood what many of
his peers did not, that the only way to preserve Florida‟s prime economic industry,
tourism, was to keep extremists on all sides at bay. Because the Supreme Court withheld
a ruling regarding implementation of Brown until May 1965, Collins had plenty of time
to draw up a “moderate” means of circumventing desegregation. The result was a devious
plan for noncompliance developed by Florida‟s attorney general Richard Ervin. 12
Following its monumental ruling, the Supreme Court asked several state to submit
briefs with suggestions on the best ways to implement school desegregation. Ervin, in his
amicus curiae submission, outlined a plan of gradual integration and urged the “the court
to restrain the use of coercive measures where necessary until the hard core of public
opinion has softened.” Ervin based much of the brief on a sociological study conducted
by Florida State University professor Lewis Killian. Commissioned by Ervin, Killian‟s
survey found, of those who responded, that 75 percent of blacks in Florida felt whites
agreed with desegregation and, to the contrary, 75 percent of whites believed blacks
supported segregation. In addition, Killian surveyed white policemen, and found that a
large majority worried that desegregation would lead to violence. Ervin bolstered
Killian‟s findings with sociological data of his own. He pointed to the high poverty and
illiteracy rates of black Floridians to demonstrate the imperatives of his “gradualistic”
11
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approach. Ervin essentially concluded that the socioeconomic status of blacks rendered
desegregation hazardous to the overall well being of Florida‟s population. The brief,
described by Brown scholar Richard Kluger as the “most extensive and spirited,” of all
state briefs submitted to the Supreme Court, became the foundation for thwarting
desegregation in Florida.13
On May 31, the Court announced its implementation plan for school
desegregation, known as Brown II. At the urging of the Justice Department and Southern
state officials, the Court set no immediate timetable and simply proposed that
desegregation efforts move “with all deliberate speed.” The ambiguous “with all
deliberate speed” was exactly what Collins and Ervin had hoped for. Indeed, Florida, was
already on its way to formulating its own policy of handling desegregation. Several days
before the Supreme Court announced Brown II, the state instituted a pupil placement law,
a legislative manifestation of Ervin‟s “gradualistic” plan. The new law put the fate of
school desegregation in the hands of local authorities and expanded the means by which
school boards could avoid compliance. 14
Brown II not only killed hopes for immediate desegregation, it also paved the way
for massive white resistance in the South. In 1956, the separation of the races took center
stage. With President Eisenhower refusing to push for more than token desegregation,
opportunistic Southern politicians seized the moment by demagogically defending
segregation. More than a hundred Southern congressmen-including Florida senators
George Smathers and Spessard Holland- signed the “Southern Manifesto,” a document
13
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pledging to resist all attempts to implement Brown. Pressure came from the bottom up as
well. Southern public opinion polls taken at the time revealed that 80% of white
Southerners opposed school desegregation. 15
During the Gubernatorial election, Collins‟s political rivals seized the opportunity
to attack his “weak” stance on segregation. To fend off his critics, Collins turned up the
dial on his commitment to segregation, but he never quite matched opponent Sumter
Lowry, who called for “one hundred percent” segregation. Although Lowry garnered
more than 100,000 votes, the electorate ultimately preferred Collins‟s more temperate
approach to noncompliance. Over the next four years the state‟s plan of gradualism and
civil noncompliance effectively prevented meaningful school desegregation. By the time
Collins left office in 1961, only one school, Orchid Villa elementary in Miami, had
integrated its classrooms. 16
Collins may have disagreed with Florida‟s more extreme political elements, but
he had at least one thing in common with his rival and former governor, Charley Johns.
Both men, for their own reasons, detested the NAACP. And in 1956, Collins gave
Johns‟s Florida Legislative Investigative Committee (FLIC) the greenlight. The FLIC,
later dubbed the Johns committee, performed the functions of a localized House UnAmerican Activities Committee, tormenting any organization, person, or group,
considered subversive. In its early years, the FLIC directed much of its harassment at the
state NAACP and its branches, weakening their ability to fight for desegregation.17
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In Pinellas County, where Collins received 69% of the vote in 1956, one can see
the perfect execution of “gradualism.” There “is nothing to get excited about,”
admonished school board Superintendent Floyd T. Christian in response to the Brown
decision. Christian predicted no “major changes.” For the next year local politicians and
school board officials simply avoided discussing the issue. 18
Christian did not, however, speak for everyone. St. Petersburg‟s black residents
greeted the decision with a “absolute celebration,” remembered C. Bette Wimbish. Brown
injected life into the struggling St. Petersburg branch of the NAACP, and with the help of
state and national officials the branch began to formulate ways of enforcing
desegregation. Another voice in the community, the St. Petersburg Times, which had
long championed school desegregation, suggested in an editorial that the city take the
lead in complying with Brown because its people had a higher degree of social
conscience. Even after the announcement of Brown II, the Times called for the adoption
of “a plan for a rational, workable, and resonably speedy end to segregation.” 19
Despite such sentiment, however, desegregation initially made no progress in
Pinellas County. In 1954 and 1955, the county school board rejected applications
submitted by Gibbs high graduates to St. Petersburg Jr. College. State NAACP officials
encouraged the students to file suit, but they refused, claiming to have applied “just to
see what happened.” Instead, a group of wealthy white residents got together and paid for
the students to attend college out of state.20
The pupil placement law bolstered the county‟s ability to circumvent integration.
In 1955, the school board created the Committee on the Desegregation of Schools,
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composed of 14 whites and 7 blacks. Contrary to its name, the committee merely devised
ways of instituting the pupil placement law, and as a result, every black application to a
white school between 1954 and 1959 was rejected.21
With control of school desegregation in the hands of individual school districts,
and with institutions like the NAACP under fire from the Johns Committee, the Pinellas
County‟s Board of Public Instruction also made a half-hearted effort to equalize
educational opportunities for black students. Between 1954 and 1962 nine new black
schools opened, while black applicants to St. Petersburg Junior College prompted the
creation of all-black Gibbs Junior College. The state built eleven such colleges, locating
them near white counterparts in areas where projected black enrollment exceeded 100
students. Such developments left many black leaders conflicted. Although they grimaced
every time a new black school opened, the reality of better supplies and facilties for black
students was a welcome development. The push for integration, however, continued.
When a new all-white high school, Dixie Hollins, opened in 1959, eleven black students
applied. NAACP attorney Francisco Rodriguez sent a series of petitions to
Superintendent Christian to admit the students. Christian, while appearing to give the
petitions serious consideration, ultimately rejected the applications. Instead, in an effort
to sustain the pupil placement law‟s capacity to prevent wholesale desegregation, the
school board inititiated token integration in 1961. That summer St. Petersburg Junior
College admitted two black students and in 1962, St. Petersburg High School, and
Tomlinson Vocational School admitted several black students. By the1963 100 blacks
had transferred to previously all-white schools, and black leaders expected additional
20
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desegregation the following year. But by the start of the 1964 school year, only two
percent of the county‟s black students were attending classes with whites. Tokenism was
still the order of the day.22
***
Sitting in his Boston apartment one day, Jim Sanderlin, thirty-three years old and
fresh out of law school, had a decision to make. He had job offers from firms in Boston
and his family was urging him to return to Washington, D.C., where he had earned his
Bachelor‟s degree at Howard University. But Sanderlin wanted something different.
Boston University‟s job placement services put him in contact with Fred Minnis, “a
crafty” civil rights lawyer who had been across the country recruiting young black law
attorneys to come to St. Petersburg. Eager to see the “the Deep South,” but “too afraid to
go to Mississippi,” Sanderlin struck a compromise by agreeing to move to St. Ptersburg
in 1962. 23
In St. Petersburg he joined a small cadre of local of black attorneys. Sanderlin
joined the firm of Minnis and Williams where he clerked alongside recent Howard Law
school graduate Frank Peterman. The two cut their teeth working on the Webb‟s City
injunction and the case of the arrested theater demonstrators, and after passing the bar in
1963, formed their own firm with Frank White, a native of St. Petersburg and the top
student in his graduating class at FAMU law school. With the clear expectation of
22
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handling civil rights cases, the law firm of White, Peterman, and Sanderlin represented a
changing of the guard in local legal circles. 24
From the outset, Sanderlin wanted to foster the integration of Pinellas County.
Along with White, he attended NAACP Legal Defense Fund seminars in New Orleans
that stressed the importance of “institutional reform litigation” and outlined the proper
procedures for handling desegregation cases. Sanderlin‟s enthusiasm encountered
resistance on all fronts. Conservative black leaders, initially opposed to the construction
of new schools, had come to appreciate the increased funding and expanded
opportunities; and from years of dealing with the school board, they feared retribution.
Moreover, Sanderlin, eventually beloved by the black community, was still a bit of a
newcomer, and like many of the northern whites who moved to the area in the postwar
decades, lacked a broader understanding of local conditions. Nonetheless, by 1964 most
of Florida‟s larger urban counties already faced desegregation lawsuits, and it was time
for Pinellas County toface the inevitable. After a family in St. Petersburg dropped a
pending case in early 1964, Leon Bradley Sr., a police officer in Clearwater, contacted
Frank White about suing the county school board. 25
The previous year, Bradley, vice president of the Clearwater NAACP, had asked
the board to transfer his son from the all-black Pinellas High School to John F. Kennedy
Jr. Middle school. Bradley merely wanted to give his son an opportunity, something
missing at the overcrowded, ill-equipped Pinellas High. Francisco Rodriguez sent
numerous petitions to the School board on his behalf, to no avail. But Bradley refused to
give up. After a two-hour meeting with Bradley, White concluded that the proposed
24
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lawsuit would cost around $15,000, more than Bradley could afford. But it did not matter.
This was the case White and Sanderlin had been looking for.26
In May 1964, under the auspices of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Jim
Sanderlin filed suit against the Pinellas County school board. After Superintendent Floyd
T. Christian downplayed the developments, confident in the knowledge that the school
board had deflected the earlier lawsuit by ending “double zoneing” for elementary
schools. Christian promised Bradley v. Board of Public Instruction of Pinellas County
would meet a similar fate.27
He was wrong. Ruling on January 15, 1965, Federal District Judge Joseph Lieb
called for a “comprehensive” desegregation plan that “eliminated dual attendance zones
and reassigned pupils, faculty, and other personnel on a non-racial basis.” Two months
later school board attorney Edward Turville and Sanderlin presented Leib with a plan to
desegregate the entire Pinellas County school system by the 1968-1969 school year.
Calling the plan “a realistic and fair one, considering the circumstances and conditions in
the community, personnel and administrative problems,” Leib endorsed the proposal. 28
The plan may have been the best available, but according to historian Gordon
Mantler, it “contained two major flaws.” First, the “vague” definition of a “desegregated
school” allowed school board officials to declare that a school was conforming to the
guidelines of the plan as long as it had at least one black student. Second, the plan called
25
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for the closing of black schools, setting the stage for the elimination of the institutional
infrstructure that sustained the black community‟s economic and occupational base. 29
The problems with the Lieb plan were evident almost immediately. In its 1967
annual report, the school board claimed all twelve of the county‟s high schools had been
desegregated. But these figures were misleading. At the time, Boca Ciega high school
had only one black student and Gibbs had just one white one. Northeast High School had
one black teacher, but no black students. Clearwater‟s Pinellas High remained an allblack institution. School board officials, nevertheless, claimed that the desegregation
effort was ahead of schedule.30
The closing of Gibbs Junior College (GJC) presented another dilemma. Although
its opening in 1957 infuriated many in the black community, the school had by 1964
become an invaluable source of upward mobility for blacks and an acceptable alternative
to the largely white St. Petersburg Junior College. In the summer of 1965, GJC became
part of SPJC and was renamed Skyway campus. Two years later a new SPJC campus
opened in Clearwater and Skyway campus shut its doors for good. Blacks had continued
to enroll at Gibbs after it became Skyway, but after it closed the number of black
applicants to SPJC dropped off dramatically. Many black students just did not feel
welcome in the predominantly white halls and classrooms of SPJC. 31
As Sanderlin prepared motions against the school board‟s attempts to sidestep
desegregation, another group in St. Petersburg found its voice. Twelve black officers in
the St. Petersburg Police Department came to Sanderlin with a list of complaints, the
most glaring of which was the department‟s discriminatory practice of assigning all of its
29
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black officers to a single patrol area, known as Zone 13, which was almost exclusively
black. Sanderlin felt they had case, but questioned whether the officers knew what they
were getting into. “Ain‟t no turning back,” he told them, “they gone really put the heat
one you.” The officers, later known as the “courageuos twelve,” decided to go ahead with
the case anyway. In May 1965 Sanderlin filed suit against the city of St. Petersburg, City
Manager Lynn Andrews, and Police Cheif Harold C. Smith, calling for a permanent
injunction enjoining the department from continuing its discriminitory practices.
Although the city‟s two black sergeants, Sam Jones and Hosea Rogers, were not directly
involved, Sanderlin filed the case, Baker v. City of St. Petersburg, as a class action suit,
incorporating the two men.32
As he would do with Sanderlin‟s motions regarding school desegregation over the
next two years, Judge Joseph Lieb found the arguments on behalf of the plaintiff
unconvincing. Lieb concluded that Andrews and Smith, “charged with the duty of
operating the Police Department. . .are vested with wide discretion in matters affecting
the management and use of their personnel.” The NAACP Legal Defense Fund, in
addition to covering the costs, sent lawyers Jack Greenberg and Leroy D. Clark to help
Sanderlin with an appeal. More than a year after filing an appeal with the Fifth Circuit
Sanderlin discovered the Court had misplaced the brief, an error that caused a fifteen
month delay in the appeal proceedings. Insisting his office had sent the court the proper
documents, Sanderlin was perplexed. But the black leadership in St. Petersburg had a
more pressing problem. Although the “courageous twelve” would eventually have their
31
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day in court, and win, a new tobstacle had emerged, establishing a new tone in the local
struggle for black equality. 33
***
Five days after the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the Watts section of
Los Angeles, California, exploded into race riots. For six days the Watts ghetto-home to
nearly a quarter of a million blacks-became a war zone. Thousands of National
Guardsmen and Las Angeles Police Department officers moved in to quell the violent
uprising of more than 50,000 disenchanted black Americans. Thirty-four dead and $30
million dollars in property damage later, Watts typified the growing disillusionment with
nonviolence and the inadequacies of the movement‟s progress. Over the next three years
race riots erupted across the country. The plight of black America-once pegged as a
distinctly Southern phenomenon-now appeared a systemic, nationwide affliction. 34
In Watts to witness the chaos was twenty-five year old Joseph A. Waller. On a
leave of absence from his job at the St. Petersburg Times, Waller traveled to Los Angeles
in early 1965. During and after the riot, he wrote correspondence pieces for the Times.
With access to places and information inaccessible to white journalists, he kept the
Sunshine City abreast of the turmoil, and for the first time in his life witnessed the “the
power of the people.” He returned to St. Petersburg as an inspired black militant.35
Growing up in tight knit black neighborhood in segregated St. Petersburg, Waller
developed an acute racial consciousness at an early age. As a kid shining shoes on
33
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Central Ave, he asked his boss why the shoes of black folks were off limits. Later, after a
series of run-ins with police officers and white authority figures, he became increasingly
discouraged by the city‟s overt racial inequities. Fed up, he joined the Army in 1958.
While stationed in Germany, Waller experienced a sense of freedom alien to black
southerners. Friendships formed with blacks from other parts of the world illuminated a
transnational struggle that transcended the informed the civil rights movement at home.
Upon returning to the states, Waller was stationed at Fort Benning, Georgia, where his
confident and confrontational attitude did nothing but get him into trouble. Honorably
discharged in 1962, he made his way home to St. Petersburg, determined to get involved
in the local struggle.36
His actual involvement came when St. Petersburg Times journalist Peggy
Peterman introduced him to the NAACP. For a time he attended NAACP meetings and
participated in demonstrations to desegregate the movie theaters. But it was not long
before he concluded that the NAACP‟s efforts were “worthless” and “could not take
them seriously.” Impatient for substantive change, he managed Frank Peterman‟s daring
but unsuccessful campaign for a seat in the state legislature. Despite his close friendship
with the Petermans, he never felt comfortable in their circle of middle-class activists. The
discomfort was mutual for Peterman‟s law partner, Jim Sanderlin, who never liked
Waller hanging around their law office. After the campaign Peterman sent Waller to
South Carolina to work for the CORE‟s Voter Education Project (VEP). CORE attorney
John Due put Waller in charge of voter-registration and antipoverty projects in North
Florida. Waller, however, could not buy into the organization‟s nonviolent ethos. At a
36

Regaldo‟s interview with Alvelita Donaldson, June 28, 2004; Cutting, “From Joe Waller to Omali
Yeshitela,” 5; Author‟s interview with Omali Yeshitela, June 23, 2009.

56

rally in Gainesville, to the chagrin of VEP director Vernon Jordan, Waller advocated
“Black Power,” a move that led to the end of his stint with the VEP. Undeterred, Waller
formed the Florida chapter of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). 37
By 1966 the SNCC‟s message and agenda jibed well with Waller‟s sensibilities.
Proponents of nonviolence at its inception in 1960, SNCC operatives had become
increasingly disillusioned with the slow pace of change and the federal government‟s
unwillingness to protect civil rights activists. Failed voter registration projects in places
like Albany, Georgia, and the crushing denouement of the 1964 Freedom Summer
solidified SNCC‟s militant turn. By the time “Black Power” advocate Stokely Carmichael
became SNCC Chairman in 1966, the organization had already lost faith in nonviolence
forms of protest.38
With a SNCC chapter up and operational and a “motivated” Waller at the helm,
St. Petersburg‟s racial tensions heated up in the winter of 1966. The city‟s sanitation
workers, all but one of whom were black, went on a week-long strike in November for
better pay. Jim Sanderlin and Frank Peterman, though busy with the Baker appeal,
represented an eight-man committee of refuse employees in labor negotiations with city
administrators. City Manager Lynn Andrews publicly ridiculed the strikers and initially
refused to talk. Within two days Andrews had fired 70% of the sanitation department‟s
workforce, recruited scabs to fill the vacant positions, and ordered riot gear for police
37
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officers. After several days of mounting pressure, however, Andrews capitulated and
negotiated a settlement.39
The city‟s handling of the strike incensed Waller and his followers. SNCC,
however, had trouble translating its frustrations into actions. Despite his criticisms of the
NAACP, Waller initially led SNCC in a similar direction. Hoping to lure Stokely
Carmichael for a visit, SNCC picketed an ABC liquor lounge in the black community
that banned black patrons from entering the store and sitting at the bar. The orderly and
uneventful picketing lasted more than a week and received little press coverage.
Although SNCC struggled to win the support of other black leaders, Waller‟s friendship
with Frank and Peggy Peterman kept SNCC from complete alienation. The Petermans
could not always endorse Waller‟s radical views, but they encouraged his social activism
and surreptitiously provided SNCC with financial support. In addition, SNCC found a
confidante in Marvin Davies. Fired from his job as a teacher in Fort Myers because of his
civil rights activities, Davies became a field secretary for the NAACP and opened an
office in St. Petersburg in 1966. Initially SNCC shared space with Davies and could
“rely” on him for material and moral support.40
Waller not only had trouble garnering the support of fellow movement leaders;
he also found widespread apathy within the black community. Bit an opportunity to
arouse the community emerged when city leaders announced their intention to spend a
$50 million federal grant on beautifying the downtown area. Waller felt he had found an
issue around which people could rally. Slum-like conditions pervaded the black
39

Author‟s interview with Omali Yeshitela, June 23, 2009; Evening Independent, November 15, 1966,
November 19, 1966.
40
St. Petersburg Times, November 11, 1966; Author‟s interview with Omali Yeshitela, June 23, 2009;
Cutting, “From Joe Waller to Omali Yeshitela,” 20-21.

58

community, where many homes held tenants but had no indoor plumbing, and the dirty
streets Waller had walked along as a kid were still unpaved and unlit at night. If SNCC
was going to garner any support against the grant-spending, the organization needed to
prove its legitimacy. They found their cause hanging on the wall in city hall. 41
In 1945, painter George Snow Hill finished the piece, “Picnicking at Pass-aGrille.” Five years earlier, the St. Petersburg city council had commissioned Hill to paint
one of his well-known “Southern Living” murals for the new city hall. For decades,
“Picnicking at Pass-a-Grille,” depicting caricatures of black musicians with oversized
pink lips, “elongated faces,” and grins that one critic described as looking “more like apes
than men,” hung along the heavily trafficked first landing of the hall‟s main stairway.
According to the St. Petersburg Times, the mural‟s “rich colors” held the “attention of
admirers,” and “attracted interest and comment daily.” 42
Those “admirers” were not black people. “There wasn‟t a black person I ever met
that didn‟t despise that mural,” remembered Peggy Peterman. Beginning in the 1950s,
city hall received complaints about the mural‟s offensiveness. Ruth MaClellan and her
husband Charles, white social activists and members of the Council on Human Relations,
voiced their distaste for the mural. Others, including future city councilman Ernest
Fillyau and the Reverand Enoch Davis, lobbied city administrators to take the painting
down. “Instead of removing the painting,” wrote Davis in his memoir, “the members of
the council listened and laughed but did nothing about our request.”43
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In December, Waller sent a letter to Mayor Herman Goldner requesting that the
city take down the “despicable” and “derogatory” mural. Goldner scoffed at the
suggestion. “I find nothing offensive,” he explained and “must admit that I have looked at
this mural for the past ten years with nothing but admiration.” The mayor referred the
letter to the head of the Community Relations Commission (CRC), Chester K. Guth, who
echoed Goldner‟s sentiments. “It is our feeling that this mural is a work of art,” retorted
Guth in a letter to Waller. Guth compared the mural to classic “masterpieces” that would
have long been burned “all because someone takes exception.” 44 Waller tried again. In
another letter he re-articulated his points: “It is the consensus of the black community of
St. Petersburg that it was most unfair for the city to use taxpayer money (Negroes
included) to inflict the pains of racism as demonstrated in the picture at city hall.”
Unfortunately, although Waller was correct to suggest that there was widespread
condemnation of the mural in the black community, he soon realized he did not have the
community‟s support when it came to tactics. 45
After reading an article published in the Evening Independent on December 23,
describing SNCC‟s intentions of marching on city hall in protest of the mural, the Rev.
Davis called an emergency meeting of the NAACP and CCC. Davis had concerns,
fearing years of dedicated public service and successful social activism hung in the
balance. With one uprising SNCC could undo decades of progress. At the meeting,
veteran black leaders expressed their strong disapproval of SNCC‟s plans. NAACP
president Louis O. Harper understood SNCC‟s grievances, but felt other issues were
more important. “Picketing should be a last resort,” added one of Waller‟s former high
44
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school teachers, Fannye Ayer Ponder. Chester K. Guth suggested SNCC let the CRC
handle the situation. 46
SNCC members gathered at Webb‟s City on December 29, confident a victory
was imminent. On Christmas Eve Waller had led a march to city hall, discouraged that it
was closed for the holidays. They planned another trip to coincide with a city council
meeting, realizing the city‟s major media outlets would be on hand to cover the meeting.
Hoping to create a spectacle, the group marched two miles to city hall chanting “Lynn
Andrews Must Go” along the way. Across the street from city hall State Attorney
Investigator Dennis Quilligan and Justice of the Peace Richard Carr peered from their
windows as the marchers arrived. As a crowd of mostly white onlookers formed near the
steps of city hall, an elderly black woman began to speak. With Waller at her side, she
launched into diatribe and in broken English lambasted local insurance companies for
taking advantage of black clients. When laughter from the white crowd mocked the
woman‟s garbled speech and cut her off, Waller lost his patience. Turning on his heel, the
SNCC leader entered city hall, with Jody Wall, an eighteen-year old SNCC member
trailing close behind. They ran up the stairs to where the mural hung and ripped it down,
and together the two men carried the piece outside. “We‟re gonna take this picture down
where all the black folks can see it,” Waller shouted just outside city hall. Camera crews
followed as Waller headed for the black community. 47
People were shocked. “You black bastard,” yelled a white woman as Waller left
city hall. Waller and Wall then paraded down the sidewalk, with SNCC members,
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journalists, camera-crews, and other witnesses in tow. Though temporarily caught off
guard, law enforcement officials rushed in. Detective Homer Allen, who had seen the
march developing earlier in the day, subdued Wall with the help of Thomas Witham.
Down the street officers apprehended SNCC activists Tommy Williams, Lemuel Green,
John Wesley Bryant, and Crawford Jones. Before getting pinned down, Williams
managed to distract police long enough to give Waller time to get away. Dragging the
mural behind him as he ran westbound on Central Ave, Waller briefly evaded capture by
throwing the mural at the feet of a pursuing officer, Lt. Adkins. Eventually Adkins
managed to corral Waller and placed him in handcuffs and under arrest. The crumpled
mural lay on the ground with more than a third of its paint chipped off, a symbol of
protest march that somehow had turned into a spectacle of brazen defiance. 48
At the police station, Waller, Jody Wall, Tommy Williams, and Lemuel Green
were charged with grand larceny, resisting arrest with violence, destruction of public
property, and unlawful assembly, affray, or riot, and held on eight thousand dollars bail.
Crawford Jones and John Wesley Bryant recieved lesser charges and a seven thousand
dollar bail. Several of the...refused to cooperate, including Tommy Williams who refused
to sit on a bench with codefendants, an officer punched him in the stomach. The
defendant‟s “cocky attitude” continued in the courtroom of Justice of Peace Richard Carr.
“We can stand the cracker law, man- if you‟d only read it loud enough so we could hear,”
someone shouted as the bailiff read the charges. Waller initially refused to declare
himself indigent in order to secure a public defender, but changed his mind and informed
the judge he would only take one “if he is not part of this racist power structure.” Carr
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added municipal charges to the equation, increasing each of the defendants‟ bond by
fifteen hundred dollars. Unable to afford bail, all six went to the Pinellas County jail. 49
In the aftermath conservative black leaders distanced themselves from the
incident and Waller. At an “emergency” NAACP meeting the night of the arrests, Marvin
Davies stated the organization‟s position: “It is highly unfortunate that the despicable
mural was removed. We feel another method could have been employed to accomplish
similar results. As concerned leaders of the black community, we oppose any act which
defaces public property. However, we are too, opposed to any stereotype paintings of any
nature.”50
The local news media skewered Waller and his companions. In an attempt to
undermine any public sympathy, the Evening Independent ran an interview with the
mural‟s creator, George Snow Hill, who defended his work and claimed to be “hurt” by
its destruction. Often an advocate of the black freedm struggle, the St. Petersburg Times,
nonetheless condemned Waller‟s actions. “Hoodlumism is no solution to the grievances
of the Negro minority,” read an editorial, “such actions bring nothing but injury to the
cause of racial equality and justice.” City administrators agreed. Mayor Herman Goldner,
echoing the sentiments of Ross Windom during the Spa Beach controversy, said “there is
no attitude at City Hall that this was a responsible act of our Negro citizens but an
irresponsible act of a few of our Negro community.” Framing his words to imply a sense
of solidarity between the black and white communities, Goldner added, “I am sure that
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the vast majority of our Negro citizenry are as ashamed of these persons who committed
this act as we are.”51
The fallout was not what Joe Waller had anticipated. Hopes for a credible civil
rights victory that might bolster SNCC‟s influence had been dashed in the span of ten
minutes. For five of the six defendents the battle had been ended in court with either
dismissals or probation. The legacy of Waller‟s impetuous action became his and his
alone. Instead of creating an inspirational spectacle, Waller had become one. While
incarcerated he did his best to prolong the public‟s attention. A hunger strike sent him to
the jail‟s hospital ward. When the trial began on January 30, 1967, Waller fired his
attorney and long-time confidante Frank Peterman. Feeling that the trial “had to be
treated politically.” He asked Peterman to file a postponement, hoping CORE would send
a lawyer to represent him. Peterman, also defending Bryant, felt a delay would harm his
clients and ignored the request. Without a lawyer and unable to defend himself, Waller
received a sentence of one hundred and eighty days behind bars. Returning to jail, the
embattled SNCC leader resumed his hunger strike. During interviews with reporters he
dismissed the judge‟s ruling as “white justice,” and added, “the whole thing was planned
and decided before I went into court. It didn‟t make any difference what I said.” 52
Waller‟s defiance did matter, however, to the other defendents. Careful not to
mimic their leader‟s example, Wall, Williams, Bryant, Green, and Jones appeared
contrite before the court. Although Municipal Judge Henry Esteva found all of them
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guilty, he suspended their sentences. Only Waller served time for the municiple offenses.
But the six were not out of the woods yet. 53
The circuit court trials in Clearwater were fraught with complications. Presiding
Judge Charles Phillips sympathized with the defendants and after a meeting with Waller,
urged the city to grant parade permits to SNCC supporters. To lessen the chance of civil
disruptions, Clearwater law enforcment officials darkened the windows of the courtroom
and patrolled the grounds in plain clothes. But these precautions proved unnecessary as
the threat of mass picketing never materialized. 54
The number of lawyers involved in the case further complicated matters. While
Assistant State Attorneys Richard Mensh and Allen Allweiss representd the state, the
CORE‟s legal counsel John Due and Gainesville attorney Leslie H. Levinson handled
Waller‟s defense. E.M. Davis repesented Jones and Williams, and public defenders
Robert E. Jagger and Paul Barnard took the cases of Bryant, Green, and Wall. Due and
Levinson requested a stay, arguing that trying Waller and the other defendants again for
the same crimes constituted double jeopardy. The Florida Supreme Court disagreed and
the trials went ahead. Despite a dizzying array of defense strategies the jury took only
four hours to render a split verdict: Waller and Wall were guilty, and the other six were
innocent. In July 1967, Judge Phillips rejected Waller‟s appeal for probation and
sentenced him to six months to five years in prison. Later, after initially witholding
adjudication, Phillips gave Wall three years probation, considering him a risk to the
social order.55
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Waller later claimed, however, he “did not have to go to prison,” that an apology
on the stand would have led to a lighter sentence. But he was unable to “walk away from
it.” “ If one is ever convinced he is on the right side of history,” he explained, “the true
sacrifice is doing nothing.” No one,including Judge Phillips, expected Waller to serve
more than six months. But neither he nor anyone else understood the depths of Waller‟s
alienation or his determination to fight for what he beleived in. Two and a half years in
prison would both steal his spirits and fuel his rage.56
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Chapter Four: The Great Refusal
"History began to catch up with Americans," in 1968 noted historian C. Vann
Woodward. The “fabled immunity from frustration and defeat had faltered and their
myths of virtue and innocence became stock subject of jeers and ridicule. . ." By the late
Sixties, “Racism and mechanization and a lagging labor movement rendered African
Americans poor, powerless, and exploited.” The progressive accomplishments of the
Civil Rights Movement had done little to erase the country's economic inequities.
According to national statistics, in the mid-1960s black unemployment had reached 10%
as compared to 5% for whites, and blacks earned on average 45% less than whites.
Moreover, the increasing militancy of the antiwar movement and the ascendency of
“Black Power” to the fore of the civil rights struggle alienated many of the white liberals
who once-supported both causes. The social welfare programs of Johnson‟s Great Society
fell out of favor with Americans both disillusioned by the war in Vietnam and tired of
rampant racial violence. The assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. in May marked
the twilight of the classical Civil Rights Movement and along with the murder of
presidential candidate Robert Kennedy, compounded the nation‟s sense of urgency and
moral declension. America's opportunity to redress centuries of injustice eventually
dissolved in a wave of reactionary politics. History had begun to “catch up with
Americans” indeed. 1
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In St. Petersburg, the racial tensions between the white and black communities
had only intensified since the mural incident. The efforts of local organizations like the
NAACP to procure better job opportunities for blacks had made little progress. By the
beginning of 1968, fifty-nine percent of the city‟s black population earned less than $100
a week. And nowhere did the city‟s economic and racial inequalities intersect more so
than within the ranks of the sanitation department. As the eyes of the nation turned to
Memphis, Tennessee, where Martin Luther King Jr. had been assassinated while in town
assisting black sanitation workers in a citywide strike, long standing tensions within St.
Petersburg‟s own department bubbled to the surface. While community leaders like Ike
Williams and Chester K. Guth warned the atmosphere in St. Petersburg had the
“ingredients of a riot,” others downplayed the building tensions. But a month after King‟s
death, the spirit of Memphis touched St. Petersburg.2
On May 6, 1968, a number of the city‟s sanitation employees went on strike. At 8
a.m. that morning, after receiving word of the stoppage, City Manager Andrews arrived
at the sanitation department's Lake Maggiore compound where he found plenty of
sanitation workers, but few willing to work. Andrews listened as the milling workers
announced their grievances, including the lack of pay raises for collectors and foremen.
The men expressed their frustrations for what they considered to be broken promises. A
month earlier the city had restructured the hours and pay scales for the sanitation
department. Instead of paying $101.40 for six days of work including time and a half on
Saturdays, the new system paid $73.00 for five days of work. Sanitation Director Walter
Schultz initially gained employee support for the plan by promising a month-long trial
2
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period, after which the accounting books would be opened and some of the savings
shared with the workers. But a month later, support began to dwindle as the books
remained closed. The city asked for a two-week extension. After two weeks, another
extension. By then the sanitation employees had had enough and responded with a strike.
Andrews recommended the men take the day off, return to work the next morning, and
give the city time to consider their demands. 3
Later, at an emergency city council meeting, Andrew‟s labeled the situation a
“wild cat” strike, the product of a “few dissident workers,” and dismissed their demand
for a 25-cents an hour raise. Andrews had seen this before. To avert a strike in 1964, he
granted the requested raises. In 1966, again unhappy with their pay, refuse workers
walked off the job. Taking a tougher stance, Andrews hired “scabs” from out of town as
temporary replacements. But after a week, he gave in. This time, however, having wilted
under pressure twice already, Andrews was “not going to be intimidated.” 4
The sanitation workers, too, had learned from the past. During the 1966 work
stoppage, when an editorial in the St. Petersburg Times said the strikers were not worthy
of raise because they were illiterate, sanitation crew chief Joe Savage formed the Young
Men‟s Progressive Club (YMPC). The organization, comprised of Savage‟s coworkers,
hired Times reporter Sam Adams to teach them to read and write. In addition, the YMPC
enlisted Jim Sanderlin and Frank Peterman to speak on their behalf in monthly meetings
with department heads. Over the next two years many of the city‟s refuse workers
prepared for the possibility of another standoff. 5
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On Tuesday May 7, the second day of the strike, Andrews fired fifty-two
sanitation workers when they refused to go to work. For another two days (the sanitation
department usually took Wednesdays off) garbage went uncollected as the strikers sat
idle in solidarity. Several of the workers reportedly wanted no part in the strike, but
feared violent repercussions from coworkers if they refused to participate. Others
remained on the job, and later, many suffered the consequences. While negotiations
between Andrews and strike leaders continued, Savage urged his men to return to work. 6
At the advice of their leaders, 150 refuse workers showed up at the sanitation
compound Thursday morning. Only 40 were there to work. The others had come to
protest. Around 7:10 a.m. a garbage truck escorted by police cruisers tried to leave the
premises. With Sanderlin and Savage looking on, protestors formed a barrier to block the
exit. After Police Sgt. Ray Stewart warned them to back off, Sanderlin interceded and
convinced them to move, allowing two garbage trucks to leave the premises. Moments
later, as a third struck sped away, confusion ensued when thirty-five sanitation workers,
at the sight of police, broke ranks and abandoned the strike. Squad cars pulled into the
compound and officers clad in riot gear piled out. After ensuring the safe passage of a
fourth and final truck, the riot-squad hung around for half an hour before leaving. The
protestors also disbanded and headed home, ready to fight another day. (footnote: During
the 1966 strike the city had purchased $35,000 in riot equipment but had never used it
until now.) The four sanitation trucks collected refuse from hospitals, schools, and
businesses, but residential trash piled up for the fourth consecutive day. 7
6
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In light of the incident, Andrews took firm control of the situation. After firing the
120 absentees, he threw out the "new system," a major impetus for the strike, and
reverted to the old system with a 5-cents an hour raise. To drive his point home and
show he was serious, Andrews provided temporary relief from the lack of trash collection
by establishing several cities where citizens could dump their own refuse. After two days,
over 12,000 vehicles had dumped trash at one of the eleven designated locations.
Responding to complaints from other departments about the unfairness of a special raise
for the sanitation workers, Andrews hoped to defuse the situation. He announced a fivecents an hour pay raise for the city‟s 958 hourly employees. Sanderlin and Savage met
with Andrews and reduced their demand to a twenty-cents an hour increase. Andrews
countered with his final offer, 7-cents more an hour. Talks stalled.8
Speaking that night at Bethel Community Baptist Church, Ike Williams, then
president of the St. Petersburg chapter of the NAACP, proposed an impromptu march to
city hall, where Sanderlin busily negotiated with city leaders. Singing refrains of "We
Shall Overcome," sixty people headed downtown. The councilmen were, however,
unmoved by the display, and in reaffirming their support for Andrews, rejected
Sanderlin‟s demands.9
Days of fruitless negotiations turned into weeks. Over time, as the sanitation
department slowly filled its vacancies with scabs and the occasional defeated striker, and
every day more garbage trucks took to the streets, Andrew‟s position strengthened.
"There will be no more effort to meet with these people, period,” he declared, “they are
no longer city employees." Within two weeks, Schultz reported garbage collection was
8
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back to "100%.” In truth, refuse collection had been limited to white neighborhoods,
completely neglecting the black parts of town. The department finally addressed the trash
buildup in the black community, sending garbage trucks manned by inmates from the city
jail, accompanied by police cruisers, to pick up the refuse. Unimpressed, Savage led
reporters through alleys in other black neighborhoods where rotting trash was piled high
and overflowing into the right of way. But with an ever-improving sanitation department
up and running, and the support of much of the city council and chamber of commerce,
Andrews had little reason to back down.10
Pressuring the chamber of commerce to rescind its support for Andrews, the
NAACP revived the “selective buying” spirit of 1960, calling for an economic boycott of
white-owned business on May 23. According to Williams, the proposal "was partially in
sympathy with the 211 striking garbagemen and partially to protest the discriminatory
hiring practices by city hall and the general racist attitude of downtown merchants and
professional businessmen." The NAACP saw the inchoate controversy as the perfect
opportunity to redress a variety of systemic problems facing the black community. 11
The strikers got another, unexpected, boost when Mayor Don Jones, broke ranks
with his fellow councilman. Angered by the city's "poor judgment," Jones charged the
city with “sowing the seeds of the present garbage crisis." A transplant from Geneva,
New York, and former insurance salesman, Jones had been on the city council since 1963
when his friend, Mayor Herman Goldner, convinced him to get into politics. "I don't
think city council or the administration have fulfilled their responsibility or shown a
sensitivity to the community," he explained, "and these garbage men are now the focal
9
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point of that failure." During the weeklong strike in 1966, Jones had urged Andrews to
use restraint and encouraged him to negotiate a settlement. While Jones was only one
man with one vote on a council of nine, his defection provided the strikers much needed
moral support, even if it cost him his political career. For more than three months Jones
was the only major city official to publicly endorse the striker‟s cause. 12
Despite the verbal sparring between Jones and his contemporaries and the stepped
up efforts of the NAACP, nothing substantial emerged to pressure Andrews or the city
council. As May faded into June, negotiations stagnated. Andrews refused to open talks
with the "fired" men, and newspaper editorials revealed a torn public. Many residents
disagreed with Andrews's handling of the situation and vented disdain for city
administrators. Others expressed confusion and bewilderment. Blinded by beautiful
sunsets and myths of social harmony, much of St. Petersburg's white population failed to
discern the growing racial tension within the black community. Ignoring the lessons of
the Memphis strike, convinced that similar events "could not happen here," the city
council, led by an authoritarian city manager, simply dug in its heels and refused to
negotiate.13
The symptoms, however, of building social turmoil, were in plain sight. On June
5, the St. Petersburg Times published an assessment of the damage. Since May 9, the
report read, "Twenty fires had been deliberately set causing an estimated damage of
$300,000." Firebombs burned a lumberyard, destroyed automobiles, and set a house
ablaze. The St. Petersburg fire department responded to eight fires within a 12-hour
10
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period on June 4 alone. During the first few evenings of the strike, firebombs struck the
homes of two non-striking sanitation employees. Savage expressed doubt that sanitation
workers were responsible for the bombings, but confessed he "really couldn't be sure." To
distance themselves from the incendiary acts, Sanderlin and Savage formed an AntiViolence Committee. Both the city council and the Anti-Violence Committee offered
rewards for information leading to the arrests of those involved in the firebombings. But
the random acts continued. Weeks later, gun shots, firebombs, bricks, and glass bottlesagain targeting sanitation workers not participating in the strike-shattered windows and
ignited fires. Such disturbances continued sporadically in the oncoming weeks, keeping
police officers, already working twelve-hour shifts, many without a day off, fatigued and
on constant call. 14
With few other options, the idle sanitation workers took their case to the streets in
a series of marches, hoping to mobilize an apathetic public around their cause. Aside
from the spontaneous march nearly three weeks earlier, the struggle had remained
isolated in the black community, behind the insulated walls of black churches and the
closed doors of city hall. The first of more than 40 marches took place on Friday, June 7.
Three hundred citizens-black and white-marched the 29 blocks from Jordan Park
community center to city hall. Initially slated as a protest march, the event also became a
tribute to the recently assassinated presidential candidate Robert Kennedy. Just as the
striking sanitation workers tried to counter the recent violent episodes with a peaceful
march, Joe Waller and a band of followers joined the march. Waller had recently returned
from Gainesville, Florida, where his odyssey of imprisonment had taken another turn. In
14
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May, ACLU attorney Gardner Becket joined his defense team and convinced the Second
District Court of Appeals to release Waller on parole while awaiting an appellate ruling.
Upon his release, Waller headed north to Gainesville to protest the incarceration of SCLC
member Irvin Lee Dawkins. Within hours of arriving, Waller was back in jail, arrested on
charges of “attempting to incite a riot.” He posted bail, but was back behind bars the
same day. The state attorney, after receiving word of the outbreak of the sanitation strike
and worried Waller would get into even more trouble, had his bond revoked. For two
more weeks Waller sat in an Alachua County jail cell. Finally released on May 29, he
fled Gainesville on the floorboard of a friend‟s car and headed home to St. Petersburg.
When he arrived, Waller was dismayed with the handling of the strike, and what he saw
as “nice cozy relationship” between the embattled factions. As he and his followers
joined the back of the procession, they injected it with an air of militancy, chanting
“We're gonna let St. Petersburg burn down, burn, burn, down, burn burn. . .” Savage
abandoned the head of the march and rushed to quiet the provocateurs. After another
verse, Waller silenced the group, only to continue the refrain a few minutes later. 15
The return of Joe Waller to St. Petersburg worried conservative leaders on both
sides of the issue. The St. Petersburg Times and Evening Independent printed a series of
profiles about Waller, hoping to delegitimize him. But this was no longer 1966 and to
impressionable youths, Waller‟s rhetoric was just what they were looking for. Instead of
discrediting the militant, the media attention raised his popularity and increased his
following. Waller formed a black separatist organization known as the Junta of Militant
Organization (JOMO). If the conservative strike leaders, in the words of Waller, were
15
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people “in the image of the oppressor,” JOMO represented an alternative path that
especially appealed to the younger generation. Yet even Sanderlin and Ike Williams felt
Waller‟s magnetism and increasingly sympathized with his cause."It is time this
community rose up in arms," intoned I.W. Williams before a crowd of over 200 gathered
at Galilee Missionary Baptist Church. Williams assailed Andrews's "lack of human
dignity," calling him a "zero in race relations and faithfulness to city employees." Marvin
Davies followed Williams at the podium with a heartfelt plea for community unification,
and encouraged a more concerted effort in the economic boycott of downtown merchants.
“Merchants who support Lynn Andrews shouldn‟t have your dollar,” he implored. That
same night, speaking in front of a group of St. Petersburg Jr. College students, Sanderlin
articulated the fragility of the situation:"The strike provides a check on violence because
Negroes were afraid violence might hurt the strikers' position. But the longer the strike
goes without a solution the more impatient and disposed toward violence Negroes will
become."16
Other factors played a role in the shifting tone of the strike. Most significantly
was the economic toll taken on its participants. Already underpaid, the financial burdens
of continuing the fight mounted. Over 200 men with families, which included more than
100 children, faced another month with little or no income. To alleviate some of the
pressure, the Presbyterian Commission on Race and Religion provided the strikers with a
$1,400 preliminary grant. Sanderlin called it “seed money,” and said the Commission
promised even more to help cover the $700 a week budget of the recently formed
Garbagemen‟s Welfare Fund. In addition, the Society of Friends chipped in $225
“From Joe Waller to Omali Yeshitela,” 51.
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collected from the church‟s membership. As many of the idle worker‟s wives found
second jobs, and sanitation supervisor Bill Pulske announced the department was now
“more than filled,” any financial assistance helped. June sped towards July without an
end in sight.17
The striking sanitation workers lacked a similar bravado. With no end in sight,
strike leaders appealed to outsiders for help...To gain the support of national civil rights
leaders and garner widespread attention, ex-sanitation workers Henry Cathirell and
Howard Myrick flew to Washington D.C. on June 19 to meet with SCLC Chairman Dr.
Ralph D. Abernathy, who was busy leading the Poor People‟s March on Washington.
“Stand fast and know we‟re with you,” a visibly exhausted and emotionally drained
Abernathy advised, and “we will do everything we can to help toward a solution of the
problem.” Abernathy‟s aide Rev. Albert Sampson implored Cathirell and Myrick to
involve white members of the community in their struggle: “Get the people to understand
that it is not just the black community that is suffering but the entire community. Get
nuns, church people, ministers of the city, and get the liberals involved and you‟ll win.” 18
While the men were in Washington, such efforts had already begun at home. An
ecumenical group of religious leaders, calling themselves the Concerned Clergy of the St.
Petersburg Area, met with the city council and voiced deep concerns about the growing
crisis. The city responded with a symbolic, yet nonetheless empty gesture. Following the
orders of Vice Mayor Horace Williams, the city‟s legal team deleted the last remaining
references to racial segregation in the city charter, of which sections still enabled the city
16
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council “to establish and set apart separate residential limits or districts for white and
Negro residents.” The city charter contained a provision-long declared unconstitutionalthat enforced an all-white primary in local elections. The move to expurgate racism from
the charter, while hyped as a progressive move, made little substantive difference.
Battling rain and oppressive heat, the marching continued.19
Efforts to gain national attention paid off, but at the expense of splintering the
grassroots resistance. As a cast of nationally prominent civil rights leaders descended
upon St. Petersburg, local support waned. The crises outgrew its localized scope, and in
turn, became less about the sanitation workers and the racial and economic injustices in
St. Petersburg and more about demonizing white reactionaries like Lynn Andrews. The
appearance national figures, however, only strengthened Andrews‟ resolve. In
preparation for the arrival of A.D. King, brother of the slain Martin Luther King Jr.,
Andrews, for the first time since the marches began, denied the strikers a permit. He
claimed the timing, which had been set back later than usual, would interfere with traffic.
Several city council members disagreed with the decision, concerned it would only
antagonize the resistance. Andrews relented, but issued the permit on the grounds that the
march used an alternative route. Outraged, yet undeterred, Savage planned to go ahead
with the march. Andrews warned the strikers against defying the permit, and threatened
to use law enforcement officials to break up the march. King, upon learning of the
contentious developments, backed out. More than 250 people, using the old route,
marched anyway. As promised, police met the procession head on. 20
19
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Equipped with shotguns, gas masks, and shields, 160 officers-many of them
brought in from Clearwater- formed a barricade several blocks from city hall to intercept
the marchers. For thirty minutes demonstrators calmly confronted police. Some sat down
and sang freedom songs. Police ordered everyone to disband, but they were ignored.
Officers repeatedly ordered the crowd to disperse, but no one budged. After about twenty
minutes, King and Sanderlin drove by in a convertible, and the throng of demonstrators
surged towards the vehicle. Set off by the commotion, officers moved in on the crowd
and calmly began making arrests. The episode, with all the ingredients for a violent
confrontation, remained peaceful even as police hauled forty-three protestors off to jail. 21
As local groups like the Concerned Clergy continued to call for open
communications, more outsiders poured in. Kentucky state senator Georgia Davis and
Kentucky Christian Leadership Conference (KCLC) representative Raoul Cunningham
landed in St. Petersburg on July 3. Surveying the situation, Davis, Kentucky‟s first black
senator, expressed “despondency” over the “lack of Negro support,” in a stump speech in
front of city hall. Two hundred and thirty people answered the call, and showed up to
march on Independence Day. And Davis did not stop there. The next morning she led a
“pray in” outside the entrance to the sanitation department. Beginning about 6 a.m., an
interracial group of women stood in front of the compound singing and praying. For
several days the pray-ins continued before Davis left for Kentucky. 22
Outsiders kept coming. On the heels of Davis and Cunningham‟s departure,
William Lamd, a staff member of the New York-based Commission on Racial Justice of
the United Church of Christ. Lamd took up residence in the YMPC‟s new headquarters, a
21
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two-story wooden house on Dixie Ave. Two weeks later, on June 12, A.D. King returned
with an entourage, including SCLC vice president C.K. Steele, Senator Davis, Raul
Cunningham, and several union officials from around the state. That evening, King gave
an impassioned speech to a gathering at Mt. Zion Primitive Baptist Church. His abstract
rhetoric touched on the impoverished state of the nation and the “many problems in St.
Petersburg.” “America is flowing with milk and honey,” he exclaimed. “I‟m talking
about white America. I want some of that milk and honey.” But he offered little in the
way of concrete solutions. Marvin Davies followed King at the lectern and presented the
ex-sanitation employees with a $500 check from the American Federation of State,
County, and Municipal Employees Union, with promises of more donations down the
road. “We‟re going to let everybody know the struggle is going to continue in St.
Petersburg,” Davis said. The more intense the local situation became, the less likely a
strike settlement seemed. Nonetheless, amid oppressive heat and torrential summer rains
the stalwart strikers sloshed their way to city hall almost every day of July. 23
The protracted struggle began to take its toll on all sides of the issue. The
national attention not only worried city officials and attenuated public support, it irked
local black leadership as well. On July 12, the St. Petersburg branch of the NAACP
officially withdrew its support of the sanitation strike. “At this time we don‟t have any
responsibilities for decisions and strategies of the sanitation workers,” declared President
Ike Williams. The NAACP had “served as a catalyst for getting negotiations started,”
22
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Williams added, and “members of the organization will continue to participate in the
marches, but only as individuals.” 24
Local police officers, too, had grown tired of the situation. By late June the city
had spent more than $60,000 in police overtime. That number only increased as more
officers were needed to oversee the daily marches and handle the growing social discord.
Although cruisers had stopped escorting garbage trucks on their runs, everyday another
incident demanded their attention: structure fires; vandalism; and the ever present threat
of JOMO. On July 8, police arrested six JOMO forces for picketing outside Webb‟s City
and shouting “Let‟s burn it down.” As the pressure mounted, and communication
channels closed, no one seemed to benefit from ongoing crisis. 25
The efforts of outside agitators climaxed on the final evening in July. Nearly
1,100 people crammed into the gymnasium at Gibbs high school to hear Rev. Ralph
Abernathy and A.D. King speak. As the event began, Joe Waller, who had been
purposefully excluded from the program, entered the gym through a side door. When he
appeared, the place erupted with applause. Waller gave an impromptu speech where he
worked the crowd into a frenzy, declaring “anyone who would starve 211 families is
criminal.” Abernathy and King followed, and the climate inside the gym cooled down.
Between inspirational orations, the coterie joined together in freedom songs; choruses of
"We Shall Overcome" reverberated throughout the emotionally charged evening. As the
24
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event came to a close, hundreds of people lined up to donate money to the depleted
sanitation fund.26
Playing off the momentum, strike leaders planned the “National Mobilization
Day” march, expecting more than a thousand participants from around the state. CORE
representative Patricia Stephens Due, arrested weeks earlier outside the sanitation
compound along with several other protesters for laying down in front of the exit,
preventing the trucks from leaving, brought in dozens of supporters from Tallahassee.
Despite such efforts, only 650 people showed up. Using an alternative route for the first
time, marchers locked arms and paraded east on Central Ave, while police officers
blocked oncoming traffic. Wearing a beard and darkly tinted sunglasses, Waller took
over when the march reached city hall. "We keep talking about fighting for freedom in
Vietnam when the real battleground is in the streets of this country,” he shouted. “ I can
hardly pronounce Ho Chi Minh, but I can pronounce George Wallace. I can pronounce
Ku Klux Klan. I can pronounce Lynn Andrews." But like so many times in the past, the
thundering rhetoric, and the heartfelt pleas, failed to make a difference. 27
The “NMD” march marked the end of the line for the striking sanitation workers.
Their cause had no staying power with a national audience overwhelmed by seemingly
ubiquitous social strife. Local support flagged, too. Days later, JOMO renounced its
support. Waller had tried on many occasions to take over as the voice of the sanitation
26
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workers, arguing he “could have ended the situation a long time ago,” but their futile
forms of protest had run their course with the militant leader. 28
Just as the strike reached its nadir, cracks in Andrew‟s hegemony began to form,
letting in a ray of hope for the sanitation workers. The city manager had become sick
with power and desperate to bury the opposition. The attempt to deny the strikers a
permit had mushroomed into an all out effort by Andrews to reject all future permit
requests. Moreover, he had submitted the names of a number of outsiders assisting with
the strike to congressman William Cramer. If a riot should occur, reasoned Andrews, the
people on his list could be subject to prosecution under a new federal antiriot act. City
Councilmen Claude Greene implied Andrews intended on instigating such trouble. “How
many people do you plan to kill during this controlled riot,” he asked. The dissension
stretched beyond city hall. To help repair the communication gap, members of the
chamber of commerce, along with Mayor Jones, initiated the creation of the Community
Alliance, a biracial organization “designed to solve problems” of poor job opportunities
for local blacks, the renovation of slum housing, and the expansion and improvement of
educational opportunities. Unlike in years past, economic motives had come into play too
late.29
By mid-August, St. Petersburg had, according to one reporter, “Out Memphised
Memphis." Despite the criticism, Andrews seemed confident as ever. "The strike ended
May 20, and the sanitation department has been rebuilt with new employees," he
reiterated time and again. Sanderlin, recognizing what Waller had discerned all along, the
futility of nonviolent demonstrations, put a halt to the meetings. A few days later, when
28
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riot police wielding bayoneted rifles arrested picketers in front of the houses of both Lynn
Andrews and Claude Greene, the nonviolent struggle was all but over. In a rare
appearance before the city council, Sanderlin, Enoch Davis, and several representatives
from the black community, made a final plea on behalf of the fired sanitation workers.
“No responsible city can allow 221 men to be fired without publicly inquiry, without a
public responsibility shown in it,” said Sanderlin. Davis warned “if the crisis goes
unsettled,” the more than 5,000 members of the seven local black churches would take to
the streets in protest. Barbara Robinson, a spokesperson for the Young Women‟s
Progressive Willing Workers Club, declared: “The black community is becoming more
enraged,” and urged a settlement “before it leads to destruction and loss of life.” The
wave of sympathy felt earlier by councilmen like Claude Greene, crashed when picketers
targeted his home, an again Jones stood alone in favor of negotiating a settlement. No one
had to wait long to realize the severity of the fomenting crisis.

30

The arrest and beating of Joe Waller sent members of the black community over
the edge. In an apparent setup, police took Waller into custody after he showed up to
quell a confrontation between a young black woman and the officers. On the way to the
station police bruised and bloodied a handcuffed Waller. “They took it all out on me,” he
said, “all of their frustration.” The officers took Waller to the hospital and when pictures
of his injuries circulated throughout black neighborhoods, the rebellion began. 31
In the early morning hours of Saturday, August 17, the city erupted into race riots.
Fires raged throughout the night, destroying, warehouses, abandoned homes, and parked
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cars. As rocks pelted police cruisers and smashed storefront windows, an armored vehicle
dubbed “The Monster” moved throughout the city, spraying tear gas canisters into
crowds of congregated suspects. The city council called a meeting that morning and
granted Andrews expanded authority over city affairs. Andrews declared a “civil
emergency” and shut down a 550-block area within the black community. Moreover,
Andrews banned the sale of liquor and “containerized” gasoline. That afternoon
Governor Claude Kirk made a brief stop in St. Petersburg to meet with city
administrators. Kirk committed 350 National Guardsmen, highway patrolmen, and game
wardens, all with special riot training, to assist in restoring order if needed. The
disturbances abated Saturday afternoon, an eerie calm before the oncoming storm. The
city braced itself for nightfall. 32
As anticipated, the rioting resumed Saturday evening and stretched into Sunday.
Again police brought out the “The Monster” to quell the violence. When the sun rose
Sunday morning, the damage report told the story: Fifty-nine arrests, eleven fires, and
more than $120,000 dollars in property destruction. An opinion poll printed in the St.
Petersburg Times that Sunday revealed for the first time the disparate perspectives
running along racial lines. 58% of whites considered the problem "very serious" as
opposed to 94% of non-whites. 76% of whites felt the demonstrations and marches
should stop, but only 35% of non-whites held this opinion. Interestingly, 61% of whites,
compared to 23% of non-whites, believed "outsiders" to be responsible for the
demonstrations. 33
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For the third consecutive night, violence consumed St. Petersburg. The
"monster" once again roamed the streets unleashing torrents of tear gas. At one point, in a
bout with friendly fire, policemen driving the armored vehicle spilled out into the streets
after inhaling the noxious gas. Later, a tear gas canister crashed through the window of
St. Petersburg resident Charles P. Kelly‟s, barely missing his eleven-year-old daughter.
As smoke filled the house, Kelly and his family stood in their front yard for over 12 hours
waiting for the air to clear. Scattered disruptions occurred again Monday night, but with
less intensity. Andrews perceived an "easing of tension in the Negro community," but
kept bars and liquor stores in the black sections of town closed for another night.
Ironically, current sanitation employees went to work Tuesday morning cleaning the
destruction wrought by the violence. 34
The rioting made a strong case for the futility of nonviolent forms of protest.
Although hardly anything on the scale of Watts or Detroit, the unprecedented violence
sent all sides scrambling into action. In the end, economics won the day. The city had
spent nearly half a million dollars on extra police and riot gear while experiencing a 5
percent decline in the tourist trade. The Community Alliance, excluding Sanderlin and
Savage, stepped in and negotiated a settlement. On August 30, the sanitation strike
officially ended. In a press conference, Andrews sat beside black accountant David
Welch, cochairman of the Community Alliance, and announced the terms of the
settlement. Conspicuously absent from the proceedings were the leaders of the entire
sanitation strike, Jim Sanderlin and Joseph Savage. Sanderlin, who had been told the
settlement announcement would come quietly and without a press conference, later
34
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admitted he felt the Community Alliance had sold the strikers out at the expense of an
immediate compromise with city officials. Nevertheless, no one complained that the
crisis had finally ended. 35
Eventually 83 of the 211 strikers went back to work under the original pay scale,
the one previously abandoned by Schultz for streamlining purposes. Those who did not
go back to work found other jobs. By October 1, the beginning of the city's fiscal year,
collectors received an increase of 8-cents an hour. Foremen earned an additional 14-cents
an hour raise. Veterans lost their seniority and accumulated sick leave, but according to
David Welch, eventually regained the lost benefits. But ultimately the strike succeeded
because of what it meant for the future of community relations, not necessarily for any
tangible gains won by individual sanitation workers.36
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Chapter Five: Epilogue
The sanitation strike represented a watershed moment in the history of St.
Petersburg. The depth of the city‟s racial and economic injustices had been exposed and
no longer could city leaders ignore or claim to be unaware of existing racial problems.
Moreover, the creation of the Community Alliance represented the first time in the city‟s
history that a cross-section of community leaders--white and black--had come together to
address the plight of the oppressed. It looked as if, in the words of Mayor Don Jones, St.
Petersburg had finally “joined the 20th century.” 1
Indeed, maybe it had. Just eight months after the sanitation strike ended, C. Bette
Wimbish broke the color line in local politics, winning a seat on the city council in March
1969. Just four years earlier, she had enrolled at Florida A&M University‟s law school
with ambitious plans to become an attorney. Just shy of her graduation in 1967, her
husband, Ralph Wimbish unexpectedly passed away. Never one to quail in the face of
adversity, C. Bette returned to St. Petersburg to finish what she and her husband had
started.2
Jim Sanderlin, too, rode the wave of his successful social activism into uncharted
waters. In 1972, he became Pinellas County‟s first black judge. Three years later, he won
election to the county circuit court. But the ascents of Wimbish and Sanderlin also
represented a racial and cultural convergence many in the black community hoped to
avoid. Blacks worried about the ramifications of integration; about the loss of
1
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community; the loss of identity. And when the schools began to desegregate, those fears
intensified. 3
When it came to education, especially in the late-1960s, blacks in St. Petersburg
cared more about equal opportunities and less about integration. The NAACP, however,
reasoned that unitary status equality would never occur if the school system remained
segregated. Until white students went to schools in the black community, their parents
would have little incentives to care about the conditions of those schools. 4
With that as his driving philosophy, Jim Sanderlin continued the fight for school
desegregation. In 1968, the Fifth Circuit of Appeals ruled that Florida, along with six
other states, must integrate its remaining all black schools or shut them down. A year
later, the Supreme Court threw out Brown II’s implementation timetable of “with all
deliberate speed,” and ordered “every school district” to “terminate dual school systems
at once and to operate. . . only unitary schools” (Alexander v. Holmes County Board of
Education). But in St. Petersburg, like much of the entire county, demographic patterns
adversely affected the progress of desegregation. In 1970, Judge Leib signed off on
another desegregation plan that instituted “pairing” and “clustering,” and called for the
closing of Gibbs High School. This decision almost devastated the black community and
intensified its worst fears about integration. However, on August 12, 1970, after more
than two thousand black citizens signed a petition to keep Gibbs open, the school board
capitulated.5
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Victory came at a cost. Although Gibbs remained open, it began the 1970-71
school year with a white principal and newly installed racial quotas. Whites made up
70% of the student body, and blacks the other 30 percent. Gibbs may have been saved,
but it certainly was no longer the school 2,000 petitioners had hoped to save.
Unfortunately, the toughest part of integration for the black community had yet to come.
That same year, the Supreme Court approved the use of busing to achieve school
desegregation in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education. By the beginning
of the 1971-72 academic year, upon the orders of Judge Lieb, the school board
implemented a comprehensive busing plan. Attendance zones separated north and south
county schools in an attempt to scatter black students proportionately throughout Pinellas
while requiring selective white communities to accept terms that sent their children to
schools in black neighborhoods for two years. While much of the bad press that busing
received came from white parents unhappy with rezoning, black children within a few
blocks radius of one another might attend four different schools. They therefore, bore the
brunt of the burden.6
One individual particularly incensed by the dismantling of the black community
was Joe Waller. For three years following the sanitation strike, while his lawyers
appealed his sentences from the mural incident and his arrest in August 1968, Waller was
in an out of prison. His personal struggle came to symbolize that of St. Petersburg‟s black
community in the early years of integration: social and cultural alienation and loss of
identity. In 1972, he formed the African People‟s Socialist Party (APSP), and changed his
name to Omali Yeshitela, which in Swahili, means “an umbrella to protect one thousand
people.” The APSP, also known as the UHURUs, pioneered a Pan-Africanist approach to
6

Ibid., 118-120.
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social struggle in St. Petersburg, and while many of the city‟s most prominent figures
from the civil rights era embraced the newfound freedoms, Waller never spiritually left
the insular world he came from. Unlike so many others, Waller never let go of the cloudy
legacies that cast a long shadow on the Sunshine City.
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